



# The Perception of Afghanistan's Elite Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran

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Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

## Introduction of Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent research institute, founded on October 2012 with a goal of providing scientific and academic ground for assessment of the strategic issues of Afghanistan in regional and international levels. Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies strives to help the society in improvement and development of democracy, security, peace, good governance and other matters through conducting independent researches, translating and publishing books and scientific papers, convention of national and international gatherings and conferences.

## Disclaimer

The analysis provided in the research paper relate to the research team and do not reflect the official position and viewpoint of Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies



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## Acknowledgment

The present study is the fruit of efforts spanning more than a year by people with the serious concern of showing a clear image of the relations between Iran and Afghanistan. These efforts, the first of their kind, aimed to present the attitude and viewpoint of a significant part of Afghanistan's society that is Afghanistan elites, regarding relations with Iran and Iranian policies in Afghanistan. Indeed, it is not possible to remember and write the names of all those who, from the onset of our research, offered their utmost for the progress of this project. However, the author would like to take this opportunity to express appreciation and gratitude for all their help.

To begin with, I would like to convey my thanks to the officials of the Center of Scientific and International Cooperation at Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, Islamic Republic of Iran, especially Dr. Lotfian, for accepting the commencement of a project with such importance and for providing assistance with regard to the project's preliminary stages. Similarly, I would like to thank my dear colleagues and friends at the Afghanistan Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS) who enthusiastically offered their help and stood by us during the entire project. Hereby, I would like to give my sincere and special thanks to the head of institute, Dr. Davood Moradian, Dr. Sardar Rahimi, Dr. Ali Karimi, and Mr. Ebrahimi.

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## Message from Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

In the field of conducting scientific and research cooperation with the countries of the region, Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies has the honor and privilege of publishing the first joint research project carried out between Afghanistan and Iran's scholars. The present research is a collaborative effort between the Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies with Allameh Tabataba'i University, and the Center for Scientific and International Cooperation of the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, Islamic Republic of Iran. The Institute hopes that the present study will be considered as the first step of scientific and research collaborations and cooperation in the region.

It should be understood that regional cooperation and convergence requires understanding toward the countries of the region. Colonialism, the creation of a modern nation-state, and ideological tensions have made it impossible for the countries of the region to learn from each other. In light of the fact that Afghanistan and its neighboring countries need to be familiar with each other, findings of this research project will undoubtedly contribute greatly to the creation and planning of foreign policies and national and regional macro policies for both Persian-speaking countries of Afghanistan and Iran.

In addition, the design and implementation of a successful policy requires bases, data and information that are the product of research. Since its inception, the Institute has been continuously and resolutely conducting research efforts and contributing to research-driven policies. We hope that officials and designers of the foreign policy of Afghanistan and Iran will benefit from the findings of this study.

Research Group

Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018



## Summary of the Report

The primary findings of this research indicate that, with regard to the security policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the perception of the Afghanistan elite does not show a suitable status, since 55% of the sample population showed a negative attitude toward Iran's security policies. The non-existence of a meaningful relation between those Afghanistan elites who have lived in Iran and those who have not had this experience shows the Islamic Republic of Iran's inability to create a positive attitude even among those whom Iran has hosted for many years. Although in general, Afghanistan's Shiite elite have a more positive attitude compared to their Sunni countrymen, it should be noted that a large majority of Afghanistan's population is Sunni, and the more negative perception of this group toward Iran's security policies is potentially threatening.

With regard to Iran's religious policies in Afghanistan, the perception of the Afghanistan elite is more positive. All in all, 66% of the sample population showed a positive attitude toward Iran's religious policies in Afghanistan. Obviously, the attitude of the Shiite elite is more positive than the Sunni elite population of Afghanistan.

Considering the perception of the Afghanistan elite concerning the social policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in their country, the majority of the sample population (57%) have a positive perception. In this regard, too, there is a difference between the perception of the Shiite population and the Sunni community. Moreover, this attitude is positive among the youth which is considered as a strong point.

In terms of Iran's economic policies in Afghanistan, the situation does not appear favorable. Though 59% of the Afghanistan elite participants have a positive attitude and perception toward Iranian policies in their country's economy sector, the negative attitude stated by 40% of Afghanistan's society is significant, given the vast amount of Iran's investments in this field. Once again, the more positive attitude of the Shiite participants compared to the Sunni participants, taking into account the religious composition of Afghanistan, is not much of a strength.

All in all, based on the results of this assessment, the reliability criteria of the Islamic Republic of Iran among the Afghanistan elite does not enjoy a suitable status, in a way that 34% of the participants, that is one third of the Afghanistan elite, have little faith in the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the other hand, 43% put a high level of trust in Iran, and about 22% stand in the middle of these two groups. This situation has a similar status based on gender, age, and level of education, though religious sect, hometown, and ethnicity create differences in the perception of Iran of the Afghanistan elite. The Shiite communities residing in the provinces of Paktia, Badakhshan, Kabul, Herat, and Balkh, as well as the Tajik and Hazara ethnic groups have more trust and faith toward Iran compared to those living in Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Farah, as well as the Pashtun and Uzbek ethnic groups.

## Introduction

Asia, in recent years, has been the home of a two-sided process; the process of simultaneous and coincident existence of development-based stability and extremism-based instability, which has roamed the borders of this continent from the East to the West. On the one hand, China has become the second most powerful economy in the world and a superpower nation, India has taken large steps to becoming a powerful country in the region, and the ASEAN countries have turned into countries with successful and dynamic economies. On the other hand, totally opposite processes in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Kashmir, Syria and Iraq indicate tremendous instability.

Western Asia has not been able to steer clear of relations based on security conflicts, and it has also entered a new round of conflicts and instability since 2011. Civil war has left of Syria but a name; since 2003, Iraq is still in turmoil, and though Daesh (ISIS) was defeated by the forces headed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, destruction of the civil war still exists, and no solution regarding the problems of Baghdad with Kurdish ethnic groups can be seen down the path. The offensive by the Arab Coalition to Yemen, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, though inconclusive for Saudi Arabia after three years, has pushed Yemen, the poorest Arab country even without this war, to the edge of destruction. In the Persian Gulf, the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia have risen more than ever in the history of the two countries, and Qatar's disputes with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain could lead to the collapse of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Myanmar, in effect, is still dealing with a sort of civil war, and Kashmir has become the setting of a show of power by the two atomic powers of India and Pakistan. In short, the current situation of the Middle East as well as the destabilizing processes in Central Asia and the Caucasus does not promise a bright future. Observing these contradictory trends in Asia, the researcher faces with two different worlds. The nature and form of interaction and the impact of these two worlds on each other have given the researchers some of the most important research questions.

An important question concerns the relationship between state-building processes and these two-way situations; and if we look at the region from the viewpoint of *Mohammad Ayub*, we will gain an understanding of the role of these different state-building processes in the security dynamics of each component of this vast geography.

Government theories consider the two categories of domestic and foreign resources in the process of state-building as important and effective. They also consider the failure of the state-building process in the Third World as a factor in the formation and continuation of instability among Third World countries. From the viewpoint of these theories, two groups of factors contribute to the failure to achieve this process: One is the small window of opportunity of Third World countries in state-building, as a result of their short lifespan, so short that they had to carry out, in mere decades, a process that lasted centuries in the West; and the other is foreign intervention and the involvement of these [Third World] countries in the struggles among great powers. In general, the assumption is that in case foreign intervention reduces down to a minimum, domestic resources can potentially provide the opportunity for the state-building process to succeed. In contrast, if the weight of the arrival and presence of a foreign actor is heavy, in order to succeed in the process of state-building, there is a need for very powerful local resources, though, in general, no such luxuries exist in the Third World. The result is that, in most underdeveloped countries, not only does the government not act as a source of security for citizens, it serves as a source of insecurity.

Nonetheless, what is the aim of this point of entry for the present discussion? The immediate answer to this question deals with the importance of Afghanistan for its surrounding region: An actor that, on the one hand, faces the challenges of state-building, and, on the other hand, is a source of security/destabilization processes based on the political and social context of the country. Afghanistan is the crossroad of security assemblies in East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. By

the same token, Afghanistan is witnessing many rivalries and complexities, in a way that one could claim this country is one of the key focal points for understanding instability in Asia. In Afghanistan, the creation of the state is not only in its most primitive form function-wise and acts as a helpless state in the same initial form, but it can hardly be regarded as bearing the characteristics of an actor in international politics. In other words, Afghanistan, firstly, is not internally a supranational group entity that has the ability to apply legitimate force throughout its territory; and secondly, its external function is defined in terms of its activities in line with regional and international actors. As a result, Afghanistan, at the same time as it finds itself in a commonly unsuccessful struggle to mobilize its domestic resources on the path of the process of state-building, has to confront a set of destructive security processes that are often rooted in foreign entities. It is obvious that this situation does not bring promising prospects to the country.

Putting forward some examples can help clarify the issue. The position of Afghanistan in the India-Pakistan conflict is a good start. Pakistan sees its northern neighbor as its strategic depth in competing with India; therefore, the issue of the Durand Border Line remains in place as long as Pakistan has not been able to bring to close its problems with India. On the other hand, confronting Pakistan, fearing the spread of Islamic extremism to Kashmiri Muslims, as well as the attractions of economic opportunities in Afghanistan, are the most important determinants of the way India looks at Afghanistan.

Another example is the presence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Afghanistan; the presence of these actors from the south of Persian Gulf in Afghanistan, neither of which have a shared border nor a geographic relationship with Afghanistan, is generally associated with two motives for destruction, both of which are justified in relation to Iran. First, the use of Afghanistan as leverage against Iran, an issue which has become more relevant with the deterioration of the relations between the three countries in the Middle East; and the other is trying to activate the Sunni citizens living in the eastern and northeastern provinces of Iran. The presence of the United States in Afghanistan and the tense nature of the relations the US has with China and Iran, has made the situation in Afghanistan even more complicated than normal. Also, one should not forget Russia's role in this game; as the relationship between Russia and the US becomes more complex, Afghanistan will potentially be one of the contexts of challenges between the two countries; and the active presence of Russia in determining the political trends of Afghanistan over the past year is a serious sign of this issue. Therefore, it can be concluded that the factors and complex processes at the regional and international levels affect the process of instability/stabilization in Afghanistan.

As previously mentioned, instability factors in Afghanistan should not be analyzed solely based on the form and nature of the intervention of foreign actors in the country and the destructive security processes and regional and international competitions, but simultaneously, they should be considered internally from this point of view. Afghanistan is a Sunni majority (between 85 to 90 percent) society with a high ethnic variety (including 14 ethnicities), and it is mostly rural. The central government has been incapacitated not only to exercise its sovereign sovereignty over the territory and, as a consequence, to spread the idea of the state in the process of state-building, but even to institutionalize and, more importantly, to create security in the country. In many parts of the country, local forces are in effect responsible for the inherent duties of the state. In almost all areas of the west, the south, and in some cases in the north, the full sovereignty of the state exists only in the cities, and as soon as one leaves large metropolises, the effective presence and influence of the state diminishes, and the Taliban's insurgency and checkpoints emerge. Therefore, the capacity and power of non-state actors to organize daily life in a large part of Afghanistan's community and territory has, in practice, prevented the prospect of a monopoly of use of force by central government forces in the medium term.

In terms of economy, it is difficult to find a comprehensive and efficient system in Afghanistan. Repeated coups, occupation by foreign forces, the Taliban reign, and the current fluctuations in

Taliban-Government relations as well as the sustenance of insecurity in recent decades, have in effect caused the collapse of the country's economic structure. The weakness of the government, together with the dispersed community, has made Afghanistan a suitable environment for radical non-state actors, who, today, after being defeated in Iraq and Syria, have no proper ground for presence and activity in the Middle East. This issue can be seen in the increase of ISIS's influence and presence in the region over the past two years. In this context, the most important problem is the normalization of the critical situation. When a crisis is prolonged, its presence becomes virtually marginal and unimportant and, in a sense, it becomes an ordinary and conventional issue in the international system. More than 40 years of instability in Afghanistan has virtually caused the country's contemporary history to originate from a long and continuous crisis. Under the current circumstances, due to the multiplicity of international crises, as well as the approximate failure of all stabilization efforts after the fall of the Taliban, there is no distinct desire and will in the international system to confront the destabilizing vicious cycle of instability in Afghanistan. In other words, the intersection of internal features with the regional and systemic situation has made instability in Afghanistan the most likely scenario in the medium term.

Iran, as Afghanistan's western neighbor with more than 344 kilometers of common border, cannot be indifferent to Afghanistan. Security threats originating from Afghanistan, along with social and cultural concerns and the consequences of the expansion of narcotics production and transit, have given Afghanistan a special significance in Iran's eyes. This prominence becomes more highlighted in the face of emerging threats such as migration and environmental threats (water crisis and dust storms). Geopolitical conditions and specific ethnic and religious characteristics, the presence of regional rivals, along with the type and nature of regional and international crises, make the two-way interplay between Iran and Afghanistan vital, so that with the diminution of one crisis, another quickly takes its place. The Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan actually established Sunni-jihadi readings of Islam at the eastern borders of Iran, causing severe security concerns in Tehran. Meanwhile, Iran was afraid of the effects of Islamic radicalism on the Sunni minority living in the eastern regions of the country. With the fall of the Taliban, this concern took on a new form.

In this way, the need for a comprehensive and uniform security policy of Iran towards Afghanistan is an indisputable necessity. Considering the role of the state-building process in shaping the daily crises and current security concerns of the actors in the region, as discussed earlier, the most important presupposition of this policy from the viewpoint of this paper is the consolidation and strengthening of the central government. As a result, the necessity of a clear choice between the two weaknesses of the government and the bureaucratic, inactive and decentralized mechanisms in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the strong and centralized government in this country, on the other hand, should be considered as the most important security priority of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this area. It is not necessary to reiterate that due to the type and nature of present and future threats in this country, the presumption of this paper is the priority of choosing a centralized and powerful government.

In view of the high level and ambitious targeting, it is essential that the theoretical and practical considerations of the Islamic Republic of Iran's approach in Afghanistan be reviewed and carefully considered, and new foundations for this issue be introduced. If we accept the obvious assumption that the lacks and gaps in the existing approach need to be resolved in the new method and research only through modification and change, then the necessity of an innovative approach to research on this issue will be revealed. The present article addresses this innovation through defining the concept of "audience" and using field research methodology based on social science guidelines.

Therefore, observing the importance of "audience" in the successful creation of foreign policies, by using the tool of political psychology and with the aim of analyzing and presenting future policy-making procedures, the present research has tried to focus on and study the black box of the society of Afghanistan considered as the "audience". Utilizing this research method and for the first time in the field of Iran's foreign policy studies, this study has tried to integrate theoretical subjects with field

statistics and present its results as an inseparably simultaneous theoretical, experimental and field study. The result is an interactive picture that has put the language of statistics and numbers beside the abstract language of analysis in order to give attention to the most abstract subjects next to the most tangible ones.

The entire scientific heritage of this research is based on the notion that the general logic of society and, hence, of politics, cannot be grasped unless we embrace the characteristics of an experimental time-consuming and empirical fact. This leads to the formation of a model that, in the words of Bourdieu, can be titled "structural kinship." This model teaches us that comparison is possible only between two systems, and explanation only makes sense through the understanding of relationships through which "action" finds meaning. Here, discussions about fundamental rotation in security studies for our research becomes meaningful.

Traditionally, in the literature of strategic studies, to understand crises and conflicts, the focus has been on "the other". This emphasis has been put forth with the assumption that "the other's" contribution to the formation of the war is of great importance.

The ambiguity and lack of information within the very small amount of classified information leads to the incorrect assessment and miscalculation of the intentions of others. This is true in both the misperception of the defensive intentions of an actor to the other, as well as negligence regarding his aggressive intentions. In both cases, misperceiving or incorrectly estimating "the other" creates a crisis and a conflict. This literature does not consider any place for the role and influence of the policies of a country in shaping the perception of the elites and decision-makers of another country.

Politics, coalitions and competitions of each of the actors are made in a social environment and generate different perceptions among others. Perceptions are an understanding of the intentions of others and the implications in their performance. These impressions and perceptions create an image of each actor that is not necessarily related to their intentions. This image, for the others, is related to numerous factors, including identity factors such as religion and religious sects, ethnicity, social status, and class origin, as well as individual experiences. Therefore, an actor's specific policy or function may lead to a variety of perceptions among observers.

If we accept the assumption of the present study –that the strengthening of the central government in Afghanistan is the guarantor of the national interests of both Iran and Afghanistan– it can be concluded that the perception of the Afghanistan society, especially the Afghanistan elite, is of great importance to the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This issue holds true because the perception of the elite of Afghanistan of our policies shapes their orientation towards our country. Therefore, the role of "self" in the behavior of "the other" becomes important. Thus, focusing on the others' understanding the foreign policy behavior of a country is of great importance. Based on this approach, this study focuses on understanding the image of the Islamic Republic in the eyes of the Afghanistan elite, which, if successful, could provide the basis for future research to understand the reasons behind unpopular points of view in order to reform them.

## Purpose of the Study

This research is designed and implemented to achieve the following objectives:

- To provide a better understanding for the policy-makers and the general public in the Iranian and Afghanistan societies regarding the "perception and attitude" of Afghanistan's society with a focus on the "the elite"<sup>1</sup> about the two countries' relations;

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<sup>1</sup> The elite in this research refers to the decision-makers and officials in political, cultural and economic affairs, as well as academics and academic staff of the Afghanistan community. Obviously, the statistical society of this research has been selected and studied based on this broad definition of the "Elite."

- To acquire details and fundamental information regarding the attitude of the Afghanistan elite toward Iranian policies in the following field:
  - Religious behaviors and interactions and the relations between religious groups in Afghanistan and Iran;
  - Iran's military and security policies in Afghanistan and approaches based on political and security interactions of the two countries in the present and future;
  - The means of communication, interaction and understanding between the citizens of the two countries in the social dimension, especially the issue of Afghanistan immigrants in Iran and their attitude towards social policies in this area;
  - The means of communication, interaction and understanding between the citizens of the two countries in the social dimension, especially the issue of Afghanistan immigrants in Iran and their attitude towards social policies in this area;
  - The Afghanistan elite's attitude to the economic ties between Afghanistan and Iran, with emphasis on the future of economic relations and environmental problems, including the water crisis.
- Future use of information to create a true picture of the perception and attitude of the Afghanistan community towards Iran for formulating macro-strategies and policies in the two countries according to the statistical data obtained from the research.

### Research Method

The present research is a quantitative survey research. The statistical sample population is formed of "all Afghanistan elite of the year 2017-2018". The questionnaire data was collected by from February 2017 to May 2018. The sampling method is a multi-stage cluster sampling, and the sample size is estimated to be 730, using the Cochran formula. The data collection instrument was a questionnaire, the Likert scale was used to measure the concepts and variables of the research. Also, formal validity was used regarding the issue of validity, and the research's reliability was confirmed through the Cronbach's alpha test.

## Chapter One

### Theoretical Framework

#### Cognitive Approach to International Politics

Psychologists believe that humans, as soon as they interact with the world around them, form for themselves a model of how the mechanism of this world works. As soon as they communicate with the objective world, they acquire a sense of perception and understanding that is changeable with the acquisition of new information and the establishment of new interactions. The cognitive approach to international politics has attracted the attention of scholars and experts in this field for over a decade, and seeks to provide a comprehensive and realistic model of the psychological processes involved in human decision-making. (Boulding, 1956; Simon, 1957; Snyder, 1976; Jervis, 1976). The cognitive approach seeks to simply show that individuals tend to simplify their beliefs and information processing procedures, or they may not be very sensitive to them. Because of these conditions, they are not precisely aware of the deep details of their decisions about the peripheral objective environment, and are therefore often less adaptable when dealing with the changes. Cognitive approaches in international politics seek to focus in particular on people who are involved in decision-making processes in politics. Because people always live and decide in their "psychological environment". Understanding this "psychological environment" is the first step to understand their decisions and direction from the viewpoint of the cognitive approach in international politics (Tetlock & McGuire, 1985).

The importance of this approach in international politics has evolved over the past decades, and security studies have progressed to the extent that some people like "Stein Bruner" talk of cognitive paradigm in the study of foreign policy and international politics and propagate the term cognitivism (Steinbruner, 1974). As Robert Jervis proposed in his famous book "Perception and Misperception in International Politics", cognitive approach is based on the assumption that perception of the world and the actions of other actors can be distinct from reality based on discernible patterns and understandable reasons (Jervis, 1976: 3). Ultimately, the cognitive approach place the foundation of its discussion on a mind that is "continuously challenged to find a coherent and transparent of meaning events" (Steinbruner, 1974: 112). The mind always reveals itself, through its specific mechanisms for solving puzzles and issues, as a device that actively manipulates information. In the words of Jack Snyder, who himself applies a cognitive approach to the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis, "the cognitive approach states that the mind has the dream of achieving certainty, and even where the objective conditions do not guarantee this certainty, the mind makes an endless effort on this path (Snyder, 1978). The process of recognizing the dynamics of mind leads to the construction of beliefs and structures (like images and schemata) which allows human beings to understand their surroundings.

This is precisely where the cognitive approach separates entirely from the rational paradigm in international relations and politics. While the rational paradigm assumes actors as "conscious, self-aware and rational," the cognitive approach believes that a large portion of mental activities, which themselves have a direct impact on decision-making, are relatively automatic and largely unconscious. In fact, to the extent that a person has the skill and expertise in his own position, from the cognitive approach perspective, he will be more capable of making decisions and acting in an automatic and intuitive way.

If we want to refer to the history of the cognitive approach in international politics, it should be noted that it was in the first decade 1930s that, with the development of psychology as a research discipline, the first attempts to apply psychological (and cognitive) approaches in international politics studies were made. Jerel Rosati, in his studies on the function of the cognitive approach in international

politics, identified three distinct periods in this regard, stating that in each period, the study of political psychology and human perception and understanding have developed fundamentally, both in quantity and in complexity, and has had a significant impact on foreign policy studies (Rosati, 2000):

- Initial and unsuccessful period before the 1950s;
- The first generation of researchers on this path in the 1950s; and,
- The second generation of psychology researchers in international politics in the 1970s.

It is clear that the development and transformation of political psychology studies in international politics has been entirely influenced by the evolution of psychological studies. While the first generation of psychologists (in the 1950s and 60s) followed and represented a relatively simple cognitive process in human activities, their second generation (from the 1970s onwards) described cognitive and psychological processes in much more complex dimensions, which were based on developments in cognitive psychology and social perception, which in turn influenced cognitive approaches to international politics.

Early attempts: The first systematic attempts at the cognitive approach, the study of international politics, began in 1930s and continued until the 1950s, during which time psychological concepts were used for better understanding of international politics, particularly issues such as war and peace. Many of the studies in this period focused on national stereotypes, attitudes toward war, and public opinion about foreign policy. According to Rosati, the thinkers of this period, though having deep and accurate studies in psychology, unfortunately lacked a strong foundation for studies in international politics and relations (Rosati, 2000). Particular examples of this issue can be found in works in which individual psychology has been directly implemented on the state-nation, or approaches such as “war begins in the minds of people,” or works based on the distinctions of societies on the subject of warmongering. These efforts to for the simple application of psychological concepts to the complex field of government and international politics were not accepted by the international studies society. Many scholars of the field of international studies considered these psychology-based studies to be unrealistic and believed that they had little to do with studying foreign policy and international politics. In the words of Robert Jervis, the main guilt of early studies in this field was “over-psychologizing” of the literature (Jervis, 1976: 4).

First Generation: Nevertheless, some researchers in the field of international politics and foreign policy criticized the issue of lack of attention to cognitive and psychological approaches to studies in this field. These types of criticism, along with other developments such as the growth in the significance of peace studies together with the development of a behavioral revolution in social studies, led to the re-growth of the significance of cognitive approaches in international politics studies in the mid-1960s. At the same time, many international scholars have begun or increased their efforts to make their studies scientific and experimental. This impact was not apparent anywhere more than studies regarding decision-making approaches in foreign policy. The most important aspect of the distinction between studies in this period, which included the first generation (1950s and 1960s), was to move from a qualitative point of view to a purely psychological and cognitive approach to the study of international politics. These cognitive and psychological approaches were used from political and international relations viewpoints. Analysis levels were carefully observed, and the authors paid a lot of attention to the methodological and theoretical complexities. During this period, two different groups of researchers began to grow: Students of international studies with a political sciences background who were familiar with the concepts and methods of political psychology; and social psychologists who had extensive studies in international politics (Kelman & Bloom, 1973).

The result was that systematic studies of “beliefs” and “images” in foreign policy in the 1960s and 70s enjoyed a significant growth and attention. The main assumption was that the beliefs that policymakers have in general and the image they shape regarding their peripheral and operational environments affects the foreign policy process. These beliefs and images can be partial or general,



conscious or unconscious, based on facts or on instincts and judgment. In any case, all policymakers have a set of beliefs and images that affect and condition their behavior and decision in foreign policy. Many of these studies were based on a study of psychology called “cognitive consistency” theories. The main assumption of this strand of studies is that people, by relying on their key attitudes and beliefs, understand the world and make a great effort to reconcile their beliefs and attitudes. Under the umbrella of cognitive consistency, individuals get a cohesive system of beliefs and, on the basis of that, try to avoid receiving and accepting information and data that is distinct from this system, especially its key and basic beliefs. In other words, the main proposition is that people do not accidentally commit to beliefs and attitudes, but accept beliefs and attitudes based on a system of beliefs that has an intrinsic cohesion. New information is usually interpreted according to this belief system, not apart from it.

Third Generation: By the beginning of the 1970s, a well-known term gradually entered the literature of psychology: The Cognitive Revolution. This reemphasized the importance of studying attitudes and precisely assessing information processing by individuals. Simon, in 1985, stated that cognitive psychology has experienced an extreme redesign over the past 30 years, ranging from rigorous behaviorism to a framework for thinking only in the form of information processing (Simon, 1985). This cognitive revolution includes a new concept of the individual and how he interacts with the environment: Moving from the perspective to the individual as a passive factor that reacts to the movements of the environment toward a new conception of the individual that makes him active in the selection of the type of reaction to the environment and its interpretation. Given these developments in cognitive psychology, attitudinal studies have broadly gone beyond cognitive consistency and moved toward more sophisticated studies of information attitudes and processing; a transformation known as “social perception.” The study of social perception included an accurate analysis of how people thought about themselves and others, and had a strong tendency to use the theory and method of cognitive psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1984: 24). But in between, there was a fundamental difference between cognitive psychology and social perception: Cognitive psychology focused on the person; the person who is processing information about concrete concepts and things that are still. But social perception considered the individual as a person engaged in the processing of information about “individuals and social experiences.” The theory of social perception is based on the assumption that individuals are not only active agents, but also tend to be “cognitively miser”, relying on existing beliefs and patterns (psychological structures that provide different categories of knowledge about the various realities of the environment) to interpret and process information. Although patterns necessarily structure the external environment in a simple and distinct way, they are, at the same time, the foundation of the absorption of new information from the environment and the perceptible understanding of the world for the individual. The more complex and uncertain the environment becomes, the greater the likelihood of individuals relying on cognitive patterns and heuristics – information processing shortcuts – to understand it (Fiske & Taylor, 1984: 87). As is clear, social perception is reliant entirely upon previous studies in the field of cognitive consistency, but is based on a much more complex understanding of the nature of attitudes and how the information is processed by the mind. Social cognition and model theory, such as cognitive consistency, emphasize the dominant role of previous beliefs of a person in the interpretation of new information. However, the assumption of cognitive consistency is based on the existence of a system of beliefs with a high degree of cohesion and correlation between beliefs that ferociously resists change. Social cognition is based on the assumption that the individual’s system of beliefs is interspersed with an internal consistency, and in different situations, different beliefs and patterns for understanding the environment are summoned by this system. This viewpoint sees the likelihood of change in some beliefs over time as a common occurrence.

But how important is cognition and image, and how does this cognition and image affect global politics? In the literature of the third generation, the researchers put forward five main issues in response to this question: 1) The content of the beliefs of the policymaker or the decision maker; 2)

the path to the organization and structure of the policymaker's beliefs; 3) patterns of common perception and misperception, such as the desire to classify and stereotype, the simplification of cause and effect inferences, and the use of historical analogies; 4) the path of difficulty or cognitive flexibility; and, 5) its impact of that image and cognition on adopted politics (the determination of the agenda and formulation, selection, behavior and implementation) (Rosati, 2000).

### The Definition of Attitude

The first interpretation of attitude is viewpoint toward something. The most comprehensive definition, among others, in this regard for the term "attitude" is Lambert's. He believes that attitude is "a relatively constant method of thinking, feeling and behaving toward individuals, groups and social issues, or somewhat wider, any incident in the individual's environment." With regard to the basis of attitude dimensions and components, he is of the belief that: All social psychology agrees on the A.B.C pattern, namely cognitive, emotional, and behavior dimensions (Dawas, 1376). The second interpretation of "attitude" refers to tendency. "The concept orientation is specific to the social actor system. Actor orientation is a mechanism that determines the state of action. The concept of orientation or tendency encompasses a verse of what the activist sees, evaluates, wants or avoids. Orientation has two main components of cognitive (rational) and affective (emotional) (Rafiepour, 1372). Of course, both the quality and quantity are varied and different in each case. In this research, theoretically, attitude refers to the orientation and perceptions of a person towards a phenomenon. In operational terms, the attitude of the elite of Afghanistan has been measured in four dimensions: political-security attitudes, religious attitudes, economic attitudes, and social attitudes. Finally, the extent to which the elite of Afghanistan believes in the Islamic Republic of Iran is determined.

In order to measure the trust of the elite of Afghanistan regarding the Iranian government, different determining criteria have been used. When concepts and research variables are conceptualized, their validity should be checked. In discussing validity, the fundamental question is: Do indicators measure the same concept that we are looking for? In this research, formal validity has been used to assess the validity of concepts and variables. Formal credentials mean that qualified and experienced individuals acknowledge that the target index measures the main purpose, which is also called the "expert's test." In fact, in this method, the goal is to identify the validity of the indicators by referring to the judges. In this study, after preparing the initial questionnaire, the questionnaire was given to various political and international sciences experts to judge their validity. In this procedure, through various meetings with individuals and experts, the weaknesses and strengths of each part of the questions became apparent, the questionnaire gradually began to take on a more scientifically construct. In this study, due to the internal errors of the questionnaire criteria, internal reliability was used. More precisely, in this research, Cronbach's alpha test was used to examine the reliability of basic concepts. The entire scale's reliability index is a statistic component called alpha whose range is from 0 to 1. The higher the alpha, the greater the reliability of the scale. As shown in Table 1, the questions of trust and attitude indicators in the four dimensions of security, religious, social and economic, have intrinsic homogeneity.

Index	Security	Religious	Social	Economic	Trust
No.	18	15	19	16	68
Alpha coefficients	0.72	0.81	0.71	0.69	0.89

Table 1: Cronbach's alpha test indices

## On the Theoretical Infrastructure of Indexation in this Research

### Robert Jervis and Cognitive Approach to International Politics

The prevalence of cognitive adaptation and the desire to maintain beliefs and attitudes that are at the core of the discussion of cognitive approach in the first generation was the main basis for studies for decision-making and foreign policy researchers in the 1960s. This psychological literature and its relevance to the study of foreign policy are well-documented in Robert Jervis's first book "Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics." In this book, Robert Jervis provided a great deal of in-depth research on perceptual processes in foreign policy and decision-making and made a significant effort in advancing the cognitive and perceptual approach to the study of international politics. The topics of this book include some interesting and in-depth issues, including: discussing how cognitive consistency affects policymakers; what and how policymakers can learn from history; how beliefs are changing; and an attractive analysis of common patterns of misunderstandings and misperception among policymakers. Jervis not only showed the importance of the cognitive and perceptual approach to studying international politics, but also used this approach to critique simplistic assumptions about war, deterrence, and a better understanding of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Jervis concludes in this book that "it is impossible to describe decisive policies and decisions without reference to decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their image of other actors" (Jervis, 1976: 28).

In this book, based on cognitive consistency, Robert Jervis believes that the main factors involved in the perception, and perception of a threat, are belief, image, and intention. In fact, perception is the process by which an actor attempts to produce or create an understanding (belief) about other actors (the image) and what they do in a particular situation (intention). In this sense, intentions are reactions or actions that an actor expects from another actor in a given position (contrary to the reaction or action that the actor intends or hopes to do).

Jervis puts psychological dynamics in place of rational propositions, and he states that psychological factors can reinforce miscalculation and thus limit the rationality of decision makers. He states that an actor trying to strengthen his defenses, knows his intention well and assumes that other actors also understand his intentions. But other actors are not in that position and, as a result, do not recognize as clearly the intention the first actor, and thus move to react. Jervis believes that perception regarding intention is a lost ring that can illustrate the dynamics of government action, devoting his entire book to: How governments perceive others and their actions, and when and why these perceptions can be mistaken.

Jervis's main focus in this book is on the interaction between theory and data. In his view, man has a great desire for cognitive consistency and sees what he is expecting to see and adapts new information to pre-existing images. Expressing the influence of expectations on perception, he claims that expectations create a basis that leads to the leaders' paying attention to specific topics as well as neglecting and overlooking some other subjects. This leads to a quick and unconscious deduction and disregard for other choices. New information is always processed from within a prism that has been formed by previous beliefs about an actor and, classified and understood according to the same basis. This brings about an incomplete image of others, which creates incorrect understanding.

Jervis has a cognitive consistency perspective in his book about the change in the attitudes of leaders and individuals in general. According to Jervis, the person's tendency to maintain his previous belief and image by ignoring new information or neglecting this information is unreliable and incorrect. An individual changes his attitude only when strategies are not effective and adequate for pursuing goals for the actor. Even after this, however, people are trying to return to their former views and attitudes. Changing a person's basic attitude depends heavily on the volume of new explanatory information. Rapid and widespread changes have a greater impact on attitude and image change in a fundamental way compared to slow-paced, step-by-step changes.

If Robert Jervis's first book is considered as part of first generation literature, his latest book certainly contains the most advanced and innovative topics and concepts in the field of political psychology and international politics.

Robert Jervis, in the preface to the latest edition of "Perception and Misperception", has placed a significant part of his focus on the main developments in the field of political psychology over the past four decades. He explicitly states that political psychology consists of several components and a separate, yet interconnected, areas: Different types of political psychology, different methodologies, different assumptions, and completely different questions can be found in the larger subset of political psychology. Modern and novel tools, from the perspective of Jervis, make it possible to gain a better understanding of how the mind works, and now, neuroscience has provided interesting capacities in itself and for the rest of the sciences. This is what Robert Jervis once again reiterated on the issue of political psychology in the field of international relations and decision-making theory over the course of a long period of time, and in particular, in the introduction to his new book, "How Governors Think: The Psychology of International Politics" (Jervis 2017).

Jervis shows five distinct features of political psychology and its various forms. First, in order to understand human behavior, one must determine how one thinks, interprets the environment, and ultimately makes a decision; what the current models have rarely studied in this field. In his view, even theories in international relations that emphasize the environment around actors have left many questions vague or unanswered. Many foreign policy decisions are such that they cannot be explained and understood only by understanding the environment surrounding the actors, and we need to see how actors see the world in their minds. In Jervis's opinion, one must take a precise look at the government "black box" in order to fully understand the actors' purposes, beliefs, and perception. Political psychology in this area is a necessary and essential requirement.

The second most prominent feature of political psychology, from Jervis's point of view, is the presentation of common patterns and models that not only help the generalization of definitions and concepts, but also, in a specific way, distinguish a specific section of individuals and distinguish them from others. While looking for patterns that, if not universal, are at least widespread in terms of use, it should be noted that individuals and groups can be completely different from each other. As a result, excessive generalization of patterns should be strictly avoided. Even in a common culture, people have different ways of processing information, which leads to different decisions.

Thirdly, according to Jervis, political psychology establishes a linkage between the behavior of individuals with the identity and image they possess of themselves. There is also an essential link between the look of people and other groups and their views. As a result, people sometimes consider others to be very bad, because they consider themselves much better than them. The other side of the coin is that individuals and groups usually try to differentiate themselves with others whom they dislike; and the most significant phenomenon that explains this is the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. Jervis here comes to this important point in political psychology, which states that the driving force behind the decision of an individual or group of an individual or group is not necessarily the nature of the act, but an explanation that will be presented later on regarding the act and the reason behind it.

The fourth point in political psychology is that people, as much as they possess cognition, have emotions, and in many cases, they are inextricably linked together. Anger, fear, honor, and perhaps love, according to Jervis, are the focus in international relations, but have not been seriously addressed in academic research. Although fear in the form of threat perception has already been fundamentally considered in the field of international relations, political psychology has now made it possible for sentiment to gain significance as an important part of the decision-making process and its interpretation.

Finally, the last element of the importance of political psychology in the words of Jervis is the attention to the limitations of the prior and absolute wisdom, and the importance of empirical research. Indeed, the importance of absolute and unified theorizing is important, but empirical and case studies are essential in the generalization of these ideas and the presentation of new ideas in similar cases. Though many of the ideas of international relations interpret individual behavior and action with a series of definitions and concepts in certain contexts, there exist many other factors and elements involved in decision-making that, in giving too much attention to forgotten theoretical concepts, empirical studies, and field research, can fundamentally incorporate these factors. Political psychology teaches us that we should listen to people and carefully study and observe their behavior.

As a result of all this, when we use political psychology to understand international relations, we need to carefully consider these five elements and, in particular, make much effort to identify the emotions involved in the action of the individual, group or decision-maker. This is the issue on which we have tried to focus.

Accordingly, what has been considered in this article is the use of Robert Jervis's perceptive and cognitive approach to international politics as a kind of empirical assessment of the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan. As stated in the introduction to this article, Iran's policies in Afghanistan have always been evaluated with a single-minded viewpoint, and the impact of these policies in the Afghanistan society, and the response from them by the decision-making elites in the country, has not received much attention. The basis of this essay is an independent study that has, for the first time, addressed the attitude of the elite of Afghanistan towards Iran's policies. This article tries to assess Iran's policies in Afghanistan this time from the "other's" point of view.

In this study, the operational index of "trust" has been used to measure the three basic concepts of political psychology in security studies. Thus, this index tests three concepts: image, belief, and intention from four dimensions (security, religious, economic, and social). In fact, in the questionnaire of this study, the propositions have been distributed approximately equally in the index so that the immediate and direct understanding of the participant can be extracted in the first step by stimulating the emotional power of the audience towards Iran. This emotion is quantified on a quadrilateral scale and the amount and number corresponding to it is deduced. For example, in the index of trust, propositions of all three concepts (belief, image, and intention) are included; and these three concepts appear with a nearly equal relation to questions about this index. A number of questions are related to the concept of belief, others are related to the concept of intention, and in the same way, a number refer to the concept of image.

On the other hand, the link between this indicator and these three concepts (belief, intention, and image) in this research is not linear nor one-way, but is quite diverse and multifaceted. In other words, each of the axes measure all three concepts, and each is not responsible for measuring only one single concept. The propositions that are designed to draw the concept of an image are usually accompanied by a direct perception of the audience's view of the overall image of Iran. For example, this statement is on the security front, which says "Afghanistan's stability and development is in the interests of the regional interests of Iran." This proposition focuses on receiving the image of Iran from the audience. While another proposition on the same aspect of security that says "Iran does not intend to change the constitution and the Afghanistan administrative system," intends to reveal the audience's perception of Iran's intentions, and the statement "Afghanistan is in the best position to achieve Iran's goals," in the security axis, is designed to show the audience's belief in Iran. Similarly, in the case of other axes, the propositions communicate in a multidimensional and multisided manner.

Following this explanation, it is important to note that the whole mechanism developed in this research, as described above, pursues one objective: The implementation and quantification of theoretical and abstract concepts in the field of experimentation and navigation. The mechanism used in this study, we believe, is the best and most effective way possible to experiment with the concepts

we have sought in this theoretical field, although we also fully understand that other modes or mechanisms can be used to measure these concepts. Again, we admit that, in all other cases, the measurement of concepts with different methodologies are reasonable in their place and with their validity. What we have chosen is a preferential choice from our type of view to the subject, the type we receive from the issue and the type of entry we have to discuss. It has also been previously stated that this subject will expose us to criticism that we have placed "our viewpoint" instead of "the criterion." But we strongly believe that this logic and formula is the best formulation possible, the application of which provides the opportunity to arrive at an appropriate model for comparing systems and the issue of "structural kinship", which can ultimately exert influence on the outermost structural layers of foreign policy.

## Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

### 1. Gender

In this study, which included 730 participants from the Afghanistan elite, 61 percent of the sample are men, and women represent 39 percent of the sample.

Gender	Number	Percentage
Male	555	61
Female	286	39
Total	730	100

Table 2: Distribution of respondents by gender




Figure 1: Distribution of audience by gender

## 2. Religion

As shown in Table 3, 63 percent of the sample are Sunni and 34 percent are Shiites. About one percent belong other religions.

Type of religion	Number	Valid percentage
Sunni	504	69
Shia	220	30
Other	6	1
Total	730	100

Table 3: Distribution of respondents in terms of religion




Figure 2: Distribution of respondents in terms of religion

## 3. Age

According to the survey, 44 percent of the sample consists of young people aged 18-29. About 44 percent are between the ages of 30 and 44, and 12 percent are 45 and over. Age average has been 31 years old. This means that half of the sample was less than 31 years old and half more than 31 years old.

Age Group	Number	Percentage
18-29	320	44
30-44	321	44
45 and over	89	12
Total	730	100

Table 4: Distribution of respondents by age group




Figure 3: Distribution of audience by age group

#### 4. Education

According to the survey, about half of the sample are graduates (47%), 15% have Master's degrees and 2% are Ph.Ds. However, if they are divided into two levels of diploma (and religious) and higher education, the ratio of subjects to is 16% and 84%, respectively.

Education	Number	Percentage
Diploma	92	13
Associate's	144	20
Bachelor's	342	47
Master's	112	15
Ph.D.	17	2
Religious Education	23	3
Total	730	100

Table 5: Distribution of respondents in terms of educational levels




Figure 4: Distribution of audience by education



## 5. Ethnicity

The results showed that the Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups were the most sampled with 34.5% and 31% respectively. After that, Hazaras are about 22% and Uzbeks are 6.5%. In this study, 99% of Pashtuns are Sunni, 79% Tajiks are Sunni and 21% of them are Shiite. For Hazaras, 93 percent are Shiites, Uzbeks are 89 percent Sunni and 11 percent Shiite. For other ethnic groups, 58 percent were Sunni and 42 percent Shiite.

Ethnicity	Number	Percentage
Pashtun	252	34.5
Tajik	226	30.9
Hazara	158	21.6
Uzbek	48	6.5
Other	46	6.3
Total	730	100

Table 6: Distribution of respondents by ethnicity




Figure 5: Distribution of respondents by ethnicity

## 6. Province of Residence

According to the results of the survey, the largest sample of 22% belongs to Kabul province. Also, samples from the provinces of Herat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Balkh, each with 11 percent of the sample, are next.

Province	Number	Percentage
Herat	80	11
Farah	50	6.5
Paktia	50	6.5
Kandahar	80	11
Nangarhar	80	11

Kabul	160	22
Balkh	80	11
Joozjan	50	6.5
Bamiyan	50	6.5
Badakhshan	50	6.5
Total	730	100

Table 7: Distribution of Respondents by Province of Residence




Figure 6: Distribution of respondents by province of residence

## 7. Record of Life and Residence in Iran

In this research, the elite of the country's government spoke about the history of life and residence in Iran. The responses show that about one-third of them had a history of residence and living in Iran.

Experience of Living in Iran	Number	Percentage
Yes	202	28
No	528	72
Total	730	100

Table 8: Distribution of respondents according to the experience of living in Iran

## Chapter Two

### Attitude Toward Iran's Policies

#### 1. Attitude Toward Iran's Security Policies

##### A. The Status of Attitude to Iran's Security Policies

If we combine the 18 articles on security policy attitudes, its index will be built. The range of scores obtained for this indicator is between 22 and 86, so that the low score, negative attitude, and high score show a positive attitude. As the numbers in Table 9 show, 6 and 49 percent of the Afghanistan elites respectively have a very negative attitude toward Iranian government security policies. In contrast, the attitude of 45% of the elite is positive and 0.4% is very positive.

Level	Number	Percentage
Very Negative	44	6
Negative	357	48.9
Positive	326	44.7
Very Positive	3	0.4
Total	730	100

Table 9: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward security policies




Figure 7: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward security policies

Attitude	Number	Percentage
Negative	401	54.9
Positive	329	45.1
Total	730	100

Table 10: Bipolar distribution of the attitudes of respondents to security policies




Figure 8: Bipolar Figure of Attitudes to Security Policies

No.	Questions
1	The nature of Iran's look at Afghanistan is unconventional and based on security.
2	Relying on the United States is indispensable for dealing with Iran's potential misconduct.
3	Iran secretly supports the Taliban in Afghanistan.
4	The stability and development of Afghanistan is in the interests of the regional interests of Iran.
5	Iran is not a challenge to the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.
6	Iran's foreign policy on Afghanistan is dubious.
7	Afghanistan is well placed to achieve Iran's goals.
8	Iran does not intend to change the constitution of Afghanistan and its administrative system.
9	Iran welcomes instability in Afghanistan.
10	Iran is using instability in Afghanistan to defeat American forces in the country.
11	Iran exploits Afghanistan for regional adventure and withdrawal from international isolation.
12	Increasing Iran's military presence and the region is alarming.
13	The continuation of the US presence in Afghanistan is necessary to prevent the out-of-proportion interference and influence of Iran.
14	Iran does not seek to strengthen the terrorist groups and rebels in Afghanistan, and their support is not within the national interests of Iran.
15	Iran is looking for the project of "Exporting the Revolution" and to expand political interventions in Afghanistan.
16	Afghanistan should be careful in bilateral political relations and trust in Iran.
17	Iran has a more constructive role in Afghanistan than Pakistan.
18	Iran has a more constructive role in Afghanistan's stability and security than in Saudi Arabia.

Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha	Average Score	Standard Deviation	Score Range	Minimum Score	Maximum Score
18	0.72	45.97	9.39	18-90	22	86

Table 11: References to Security Policy

## B. The Relationship of Individual Characteristics with the Attitude to Security Policies

### B-1. Relationship between Gender and Attitude to Security Policies

According to the findings, the positive attitude of the Afghanistan elite toward the Iranian government's security policy is equal to 50 percent among women and 42 percent among men. This difference shows a meaningful difference through statistical test. Therefore, it can be inferred that the elite women of Afghanistan have a more positive attitude toward Iran's security policies.

Gender \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Male	58.1	41.9	444
Female	50.0	50.0	286
Entire Sample	54.9	45.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.032		X <sup>2</sup> = 4.619

Table 12: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on gender

### B-2. Relationship between Religion and Attitude to Security Policies

Table 13 shows that the positive attitude toward Iran's security policies among the Sunni elites is equal to 39 percent and almost 59 percent among the Shiite elites. Comparison of attitudes obtained through statistical test shows a significant difference. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Shiite elites have a more positive attitude toward Iran's security policies than the Sunni elites.

Religion \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Sunni	60.5	39.5	504
Shiite	41.4	58.6	220
Entire Sample	54.7	45.3	724
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 22.671

Table 13: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on religion

### B-3. Relationship between Experience of Living in Iran and Attitude to Security Policies

The findings show that the positive attitude toward Iran's security policies among those who lived and stayed in Iran and those who did not have this experience, was 49% and 44%, respectively. Comparison of attitudes obtained through statistical tests does not show a significant difference. Hence, elites living and staying in Iran have a more positive attitude toward Iran's security policies compared to those who have not lived in Iran, though this difference of 5% is not statistically significant.

Experience \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Yes	51.0	49.0	202
No	56.4	43.6	528
Entire Sample	54.9	45.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.186		X <sup>2</sup> = 1.752

Table 14: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on experience of living in Iran

#### B-4. Relationship between Age and Attitude to Security Policies

The results of the survey do not show a meaningful relationship between the age of people with the attitude to security policies. In other words, young or middle-aged elites have an almost identical attitude toward Iran's security policies.

Age \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
18-29	53.4	46.6	320
30-44	56.1	43.9	321
45 and Over	56.2	43.8	89
Entire Sample	54.9	45.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.773		X2 = 0.514

Table 15: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on age

#### B-5. Relationship between Education and Attitude to Security Policies

The results of the survey show that the attitudes toward security policies for diploma and associate degree holders are more or less negative than other groups. The most positive attitude is among those with a Ph.D. Statistical test shows this difference to be meaningful. Therefore, the attitude towards security policies among elites based on educational levels has a relative difference, and the higher the level of education, the more positive the attitude towards Iran's security policy.

Education \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Diploma	69.6	30.4	92
Associate's	53.7	46.5	144
Bachelor's	52.0	48.0	342
Master's	57.1	42.9	112
Ph.D.	41.2	58.8	17
Religious Education	47.8	52.2	23
Entire Sample	54.9	45.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.047		X2 = 11.221

Table 16: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on education

#### B-6. Relationship between Province of Residence and Attitude to Security Policies

Studies show that the attitude of elites towards security policies varies according to their location of residence. The most positive attitude toward Iran's policies was acquired from the respondents in Paktia and Badakhshan provinces, and the lowest scores belonged to the provinces of Nangarhar, Farah and Kandahar. Statistical test shows a meaningful difference.

Province \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Herat	53.8	46.3	80
Farah	68.0	32.0	50
Paktia	32.0	68.0	50
Kandahar	62.5	37.5	80
Nangarhar	81.3	18.8	80
Kabul	51.3	48.8	160
Balkh	50.0	50.0	80
Joozjan	46.0	54.0	50
Bamiyan	62.0	38.0	50
Badakhshan	34.0	66.0	50
Entire Sample	54.9	45.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 51.479

Table 17: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on province of residence

### B-7. Relationship between Ethnicity and Attitude to Security Policies

Studies show that the average attitude toward Iran's security policies varies widely according to ethnicity in Afghanistan. The use of statistical test shows a significant difference, with the Pashtun population having a negative attitude toward Iran's security policies. On the other hand, there is a more positive attitude toward these policies among the Tajiks and Hazaras.

Ethnicity \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Pashtun	75.8	24.2	252
Tajik	42.0	58.0	226
Hazara	44.3	55.7	157
Uzbek	54.2	45.8	48
Other	42.3	57.7	46
Entire Sample	54.9	45.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 70.154

Table 18: The attitude of elites towards security policies based on ethnicity

## 2. Attitude Toward Iran's Religious Policies

### A. The Status of Attitude to Iran's Religious Policies

If we combine 15 statements about religious attitudes, the index will be built. The scores obtained for this indicator are between 17 and 69, so that the low score shows a negative attitude and a high score shows positive attitude. As the figures in the table below show, 7% and 26% of the elites respectively have a very negative and negative attitude toward the religious policies of the Iranian government. In contrast, 51% of them had a positive and 5% has a very positive attitude.

Level	Number	Percentage
Very Negative	51	7.0
Negative	194	26.6
Positive	446	61.1
Very Positive	39	5.3
Total	730	100

Table 19: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward religious policies




Figure 9: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward religious policies

Attitude	Number	Percentage
Negative	245	33.6
Positive	485	66.4
Total	730	100

Table 20: Bipolar distribution of the attitudes of respondents to religious policies




Figure 10: Bipolar Figure of Attitudes to Religious Policies



No.	Questions
19	Iran's approach to religious beliefs is a threat to Afghanistan's security policy.
20	Iran's support for Shiites in Afghanistan is alarming.
21	An important part of Afghanistan's instability is due to Iran's actions on religious sectarianism.
22	Iran is seeking an effective struggle with extremist Islamic fundamentalism in the region.
23	Wahhabi Takfiri groups are the common enemy of Iran and Afghanistan.
24	Iran's approach to religion can disrupt the social order of Afghanistan.
25	Jafari is one of the official religions in Afghanistan, and its propaganda by Iran is not a threat to Afghanistan.
26	Iran's Shi'ism in the region is the most important factor in the division and blow to Islamic unity.
27	Iran's efforts to spread Shiite religion in Afghanistan must seriously be dealt with.
28	Shi'a and Sunni are two jurisprudence approaches to a belief named Islam, and both are equally important and respectful.
29	The propaganda of Shi'ism by Iran can lead to a kind of Shi'a fundamentalism.
31	The Sunni mainstream, known as tradition and congregation, has no major contradiction with Shi'ism.
32	The Shiite school of thought is an apostate thought system that has been able to spread divisions in the Islamic world with Iranian support and extensive propaganda.
33	Shi'ism does not conflict with the principles of Islam, but political Shi'ism in Iran could lead to a widening gap between Muslims.

Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha	Average Score	Standard Deviation	Score Range	Minimum Score	Maximum Score
15	0.81	43.97	11.03	15-75	17	69

Table 21: References to Religious Policy

## B. The Relationship of Individual Characteristics with the Attitude to Religious Policies

### B-1. Relationship between Gender and Attitude to Religious Policies

According to the findings, the positive attitude of the Afghanistan women elite towards the Iranian government's religious policies was slightly higher than that of men. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, it can be inferred that the elite men and women of Afghanistan have an almost identical attitude toward Iranian religious policies.

Gender \ Attitude	Attitude		Number
	Negative	Positive	
Male	34.2	65.8	444
Female	32.5	67.5	286
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.632		X <sup>2</sup> = 0.230

Table 22: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on gender

### B-2. Relationship between Religion and Attitude to Religious Policies

The following table shows that the positive attitude toward religious policies among Iranians in the Sunni elites is equal to 57 percent and 87 percent among the Shiite respondents. Comparison of attitudes obtained through statistical test shows a significant difference. Therefore, it can be concluded that Shiite elites have a significantly more positive attitude than Sunni religious elites toward Iran.

Religion \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Sunni	42.5	57.5	504
Shiite	13.2	86.8	220
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	724
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X2 = 58.876

Table 23: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on religion

### B-3. Relationship between Experience of Living in Iran and Attitude to Religious Policies

The following table shows that the positive attitude toward Iranian religious policies is 10% among those who have/had stayed in Iran and 90% for those who have not experienced this. Comparing, through the statistical test, the attitudes obtained shows a significant difference (Sig = 0.010). It can be concluded that the elites who have the experience of living in Iran have a more positive attitude toward Iranian religious policies compared to those who have not lived in Iran.

Experience \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Yes	26.2	73.8	202
No	36.4	63.6	528
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.010		X2 = 6.719

Table 24: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on experience of living in Iran

### B-4. Relationship between Age and Attitude to Religious Policies

The results of this study show that the age of people does not have a meaningful relation with religious attitudes toward religious policies. In other words, elites of all age ranges have almost the same attitude toward religious policies.

Age \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
18-29	35.3	64.7	320
30-44	32.4	67.6	321
45 and Over	31.5	68.5	89
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.667		X2 = 0.811

Table 25: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on age

### B-5. Relationship between Education and Attitude to Religious Policies

Studies show that the positive attitude toward religious policies of individuals increases with a rise in their education level. The least positive attitude was for those with religious education as well as for those with a diploma. In contrast, those with a Ph.D. had the most positive attitude toward Iranian religious policies.

Education \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Diploma	38.0	62.0	92
Associate	40.3	59.7	144
Bachelor	30.7	69.3	342
Master	28.6	71.4	112
Ph.D.	29.4	70.6	17
Religious Education	43.5	56.5	23
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.093		X2 = 7.393

Table 26: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on education

### B-6. Relationship between Province of Residence and Attitude to Religious Policies

Studies show that positive attitudes toward religious policies vary according to the respondent's place of residence. Using statistical test shows a meaningful difference. The findings of the research show that the elites of Paktia and Bamiyan provinces have a more positive attitude toward Iranian religious policies than other provinces. In contrast, the least positive attitude toward these policies has been among the audience in Nangarhar province.

Province \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Herat	32.5	67.5	80
Farah	44.0	56.0	50
Paktia	12.0	88.0	50
Kandahar	33.8	66.3	80
Nangarhar	83.8	16.3	80
Kabul	25.6	74.4	160
Balkh	27.5	72.5	80
Joozjan	22.0	78.0	50
Bamiyan	14.0	86.0	50
Badakhshan	32.0	68.0	50
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X2 = 120.753

Table 27: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on province of residence

## B-7. Relationship between Ethnicity and Attitude to Religious Policies

Studies show that attitudes toward religious politics in Iran differ according to ethnicity in Afghanistan. A statistical test shows a significant difference. A closer examination shows that the Hazara people have a more positive attitude towards Iranian religious policies than other ethnic groups, and the Pashtuns have a more negative attitude toward Iran's religious policies in Afghanistan.

Ethnicity \ Attitude	Attitude		Number
	Negative	Positive	
Pashtun	53.2	46.8	252
Tajik	30.1	69.9	226
Hazara	12.7	87.3	157
Uzbek	27.1	72.9	48
Other	21.7	78.3	46
Entire Sample	33.6	66.4	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 79.445

Table 28: The attitude of elites towards religious policies based on ethnicity

## 3. Attitude Towards Iran's Social Policies

### A. The Status of Attitude to Iran's Social Policies

If we combine 19 statements on the attitude towards Iran's social policies, the index will be built. The scores obtained for this index are between 16 and 84, so the low score shows the negative attitude, and the high score indicates a positive attitude. As shown in the table below, 4% and 39% of the respondents have respectively a very negative and a negative attitude towards the social policies of the Iranian government. In contrast, for 57% of the elite, the attitudes are at the positive level, and finally, the attitude for 0.3% of the respondents is very positive.

Level	Number	Percentage
Very Negative	31	4.2
Negative	282	38.6
Positive	415	56.8
Very Positive	2	0.3
Total	730	100

Table 29: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward social policies




Figure 11: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward social policies

Attitude	Number	Percentage
Negative	313	42.9
Positive	417	57.1
Total	730	100

Table 30: Bipolar distribution of the attitudes of respondents to social policies




Figure 12: Bipolar Figure of Attitudes to Social Policies

No.	Questions
35	In order to maintain the independence of Afghanistan, we must prevent the spread of Persian language.
36	Common Persian culture (poetry, music, and literature) has created a sense of closeness between the two nations of Iran and Afghanistan.
37	Afghan immigrants in Iran have equal social and economic opportunities with Iranian citizens.
38	It is better not to allow Iran to penetrate and influence Afghanistan culturally.
39	Afghan immigrants face a lot of problems in Iran and the way Iran treats Afghanistan's immigrants is not suitable.
40	In Afghanistan, expressing interest in Iran leads to a challenge in the administrative and social context.

41	Afghan refugees in Iran, regardless of their location, they are treated with a humiliating attitude.
42	Iran does not seek to politically exploit the culture development and Persian language promotion in Afghanistan.
43	Afghan immigrants trained and educated in Iran play an important and positive role in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.
44	Iranian citizens and politicians in general have a humiliating look at Afghanistan and its population.
45	Working and cooperating with Iranians is not easy for me as an Afghanistan national.
46	I prefer to travel to a country other than Iran for recreational and tourist purposes.
47	Iran seeks to register and distinguish celebrities of Persian literature, music, and history only under its name.
48	The Iranian media do not have a constructive view to Afghanistan and only reflect the problems in this country.
49	If I need to have treatment for an illness outside of Afghanistan, I prefer not to travel to Iran for that purpose.
50	Iran has considered the Persian language and culture as a key priority in regulating its relations with Afghanistan.
51	In my interaction with the Iranian people and the Iranian people, I have a pleasant sense, and I consider the nation of Iran my friend and brother.
52	The Iranian civil and intellectual community has a positive and constructive attitude toward Afghanistan.

Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha	Average Score	Standard Deviation	Score Range	Minimum Score	Maximum Score
19	0.71	50.68	9.94	19-95	16	84

Table 31: References to Social Policy

## B. The Relationship of Individual Characteristics with the Attitude to Social Policies

### B-1. Relationship between Gender and Attitude to Social Policies

According to the findings, the positive attitude of the Afghanistan women elite towards the Iranian government's social policies was slightly higher than that of men. This difference does not show a significant difference as indicated by a statistical test. Therefore, it can be inferred that the elite men and women of Afghanistan have an almost identical attitude to Iran's social policies.

Gender \ Attitude	Attitude		Number
	Negative	Positive	
Male	43.7	56.3	444
Female	41.6	58.4	286
Entire Sample	42.9	57.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.578		X <sup>2</sup> = 0.309

Table 32: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on gender

### B-2. Relationship between Religion and Attitude to Social Policies

The findings show that Shiite elites have a much more positive attitude toward Iranian social policies than Sunni respondents. This difference is statistically significant.

Religion \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Sunni	49.6	80.4	504
Shiite	28.6	71.4	220
Entire Sample	43.2	56.8	724
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 27.433

Table 33: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on religion

### B-3. Relationship between Experience of Living in Iran and Attitude to Social Policies

The results of the table indicate that positive attitudes toward Iranian social policies exist among 66 percent of those living/ residing in Iran and 54 percent of those who did not have this experience. This difference is statistically significant. It can be concluded that the Afghanistan elites living in Iran have a more positive attitude toward social policies than those who have not lived in Iran.

Experience \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Yes	33.7	66.3	202
No	46.4	53.6	528
Entire Sample	42.9	57.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.002		X <sup>2</sup> = 9.679

Table 34: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on experience of living in Iran

### B-4. Relationship between Age and Attitude to Social Policies

Findings of the research show a significant relationship between the age of the elite of Afghanistan and the attitude towards Iran's social policies. In other words, the older they get, the more positive their attitude toward the social policies of Iran in Afghanistan. Also, among young Afghans, there is a more positive attitude compared to the middle-aged population.

Age \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
18-29	41.3	58.8	320
30-44	47.0	53.0	321
45 and Over	33.7	66.9	89
Entire Sample	42.9	57.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.059		X <sup>2</sup> = 5.673

Table 35: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on age

### B-5. Relationship between Education and Attitude to Social Policies

Studies show that students with a Master's degree have the most positive attitude toward Iranian social policies while respondents with an Associate's degree have a relatively negative attitude toward these policies. But in general, there is no significant relationship between age and attitudes toward these policies.

Education \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Diploma	54.3	45.7	92
Associate's	41.7	58.3	144
Bachelor's	42.1	57.9	342
Master's	38.4	61.6	112
Ph.D.	41.2	58.8	17
Religious Education	39.1	60.9	23
Entire Sample	42.9	57.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.289		X <sup>2</sup> = 6.183

Table 36: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on education

### B-6. Relationship between Province of Residence and Attitude to Social Policies

Studies show that attitudes toward social policies vary according to the respondents' place of residence. Statistical testing shows a meaningful difference (Sig = 0.001). More precise findings show that the elites of Paktia, Badakhshan, Herat and Kabul have significantly more positive attitudes toward Iranian social policies than other provinces. In contrast, the most negative attitude toward social policies of Iran can be seen among the elite of Nangarhar province.

Province \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Herat	28.8	71.3	80
Farah	50.0	50.0	50
Paktia	26.0	74.0	50
Kandahar	48.8	51.3	80
Nangarhar	71.3	28.8	80
Kabul	37.5	62.5	160
Balkh	41.3	58.8	80
Joozjan	56.0	44.0	50
Bamiyan	46.0	54.0	50
Badakhshan	24.0	76.0	50
Entire Sample	42.9	57.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 53.755

Table 37: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on province of residence



## B-7. Relationship between Ethnicity and Attitude to Social Policies

Studies show that attitudes toward Iranian social policies differ according to ethnicity. The results of the statistical test show a significant difference in this relation. Therefore, Pashtun elites have a more negative attitude toward Iran's social policies than other ethnic groups. In contrast, Hazaras and Tajiks have a more positive attitude toward the social policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ethnicity \ Attitude	Attitude		Number
	Negative	Positive	
Pashtun	58.7	41.3	252
Tajik	33.6	66.4	226
Hazara	31.0	69.0	157
Uzbek	43.8	56.3	48
Other	41.3	58.7	46
Entire Sample	42.9	57.1	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 42.893

Table 38: The attitude of elites towards social policies based on ethnicity

## 4. Attitude Toward Iran's Economic Policies

### A. The Status of Attitude to Iran's Economic Policies

As we combine the 16 statements on the attitude to economic policies, its index will be built. The range of scores obtained for this indicator is between 18 and 68, so the low score shows the negative attitude, and the high score indicates a positive opinion. As the figures in the table below show, 8% and 32% of the elites, respectively, have a very negative and negative attitude toward Iran's economic policies. In contrast, 58% have a positive attitude of 0.7% have a very positive attitude.

Level	Number	Percentage
Very Negative	61	8.4
Negative	235	32.2
Positive	429	58.7
Very Positive	5	0.7
Total	730	100

Table 39: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward economic policies




Figure 13: Distribution of respondents in terms of attitudes toward economic policies

Attitude	Number	Percentage
Negative	296	40.5
Positive	434	59.5
Total	730	100

Table 40: Bipolar distribution of the attitudes of respondents to economic policies




Figure 14: Bipolar Figure of Attitudes to Economic Policies

No.	Questions
54	The comprehensive agreement between Iran and Afghanistan is the basis of a solid bilateral interest.
55	Iran has no right in the issue of the Hirmand and the subject of the two countries' treaties, and there is no prospect of bullying.
56	Iran's investment in western mines will lead to more economic and political influence for Iran.
57	Afghanistan should focus on trade with major European and American countries.
58	Iran as a neighboring country is as important as the European and American economies for trade and economic prosperity in Afghanistan.

59	Iran is an effective country in contributing to Afghanistan's economic development, and the need for strong, bilateral economic relations with Iran is felt.
60	Iran's aid to Afghanistan's economic reconstruction did not have a purpose other than political influence.
61	Afghanistan should be the alternative route for Iran to transfer oil from Central Asia.
62	The closer cooperation with the global economy is more in line with the situation in Afghanistan than the development model of Iran.
63	The pressure from the war and sanctions on Iran will lead to economic damage to Afghanistan.
64	Iranian goods are usually of low quality and if I can choose to buy a product, I will not use Iranian goods.
65	Regarding the drought situation in the region, Iran's efforts to get a fair deal from Hirmand intensify Afghanistan's water problems.
66	Iran's investments in Afghanistan will have important contributions to Afghanistan's economic and social development and they should continue.
68	Afghanistan can find better business partners than Iran in the region and should create serious economic rivals for Iran in Afghanistan.
69	The ideal pattern for the development of Afghanistan is Western-American.

Number of Items	Cronbach's Alpha	Average Score	Standard Deviation	Score Range	Minimum Score	Maximum Score
16	0.69	41.87	8.3	16-80	18	68

Table 41: References to Economic Policy

## B. The Relationship of Individual Characteristics with the Attitude to Economic Policies

### B-1. Relationship between Gender and Attitude to Economic Policies

According to the findings, the positive attitude of the Afghanistan elite towards Iran's economic policies is 62 percent in women and 52 percent among men. This difference does not show a significant difference with the use of appropriate statistical test. Therefore, it can be inferred that the elite women and men of Afghanistan have an almost identical attitude toward Iran's economic policies.

Gender \ Attitude	Attitude		Number
	Negative	Positive	
Male	42.1	57.9	444
Female	38.1	61.9	286
Entire Sample	40.5	59.5	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.282		X <sup>2</sup> = 1.158

Table 42: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on gender

### B-2. Relationship between Religion and Attitude to Economic Policies

The findings of the table below indicate that the positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies is 53% among the Sunni elites and 73% among the Shiite elite. Comparison of attitudes obtained through statistical test shows a significant difference. It can be concluded that Shiite elites have a more positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies.

Religion \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Sunni	46.6	53.4	504
Shiite	26.8	73.2	220
Entire Sample	40.6	59.4	724
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X2 = 24.917

Table 43: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on religion

### B-3. Relationship between Experience of Living in Iran and Attitude to Economic Policies

The findings of the research on the attitudes toward economic policies among people who have experience of residence in Iran compared with an audience that does not have this experience, shows a meaningful difference through the statistical test. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the elites who reside or have resided in Iran have a more positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies than those who have not lived in Iran.

Experience \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Yes	32.2	67.8	202
No	43.8	56.3	528
Entire Sample	40.5	59.5	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.004		X2 = 8.116

Table 44: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on experience of living in Iran

### B-4. Relationship between Age and Attitude to Economic Policies

The results of the survey on the attitude towards economic policies based on the age of people do not show a meaningful relationship. In other words, the increase or decrease in the elite's age does not affect their attitude toward Iran's economic policies.

Age \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
18-29	41.2	58.8	320
30-44	40.8	59.2	321
45 and Over	37.1	62.9	89
Entire Sample	40.5	59.5	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.771		X2 = 0.519

Table 45: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on age

### B-5. Relationship between Education and Attitude to Economic Policies

Studies show that among individuals with a higher level of education, there is a more positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies, and this issue is significantly reverse in the audience with lower education.

Education \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Diploma	54.3	45.7	92
Associate's	43.8	56.2	144
Bachelor's	36.8	63.2	342
Master's	37.5	62.5	112
Ph.D.	29.4	70.6	17
Religious Education	43.5	56.5	23
Entire Sample	40.5	59.5	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.047		X <sup>2</sup> = 11.217

Table 46: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on education

### B-6. Relationship between Province of Residence and Attitude to Economic Policies

Studies show that the attitude to economic policies varies by location. Using statistical testing shows a meaningful difference. More accurate findings show that the elites of Paktia and Badakhshan provinces have a more positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies than other provinces. In contrast, the respondents in Nangarhar and Joozjan provinces have a negative attitude in this regard.

Province \ Attitude	Negative	Positive	Number
Herat	28.8	71.3	80
Farah	50.0	50.0	50
Paktia	26.0	74.0	50
Kandahar	48.8	51.3	80
Nangarhar	71.3	28.8	80
Kabul	37.5	62.5	160
Balkh	41.3	58.8	80
Joozjan	56.0	44.0	50
Bamiyan	46.0	54.0	50
Badakhshan	24.0	76.0	50
Entire Sample	40.5	59.5	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 69.024

Table 47: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on province of residence

### B-7. Relationship between Ethnicity and Attitude to Economic Policies

Studies show that attitudes toward economic policies differ according to ethnicity. Using statistical testing shows a meaningful difference. Therefore, it can be said that the Pashtun and Uzbek elites have a relatively negative attitude, and the Hazara and Tajik elites have a more positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies.

Ethnicity	Attitude		Number
	Negative	Positive	
Pashtun	57.9	42.1	252
Tajik	32.7	67.3	226
Hazara	25.9	74.1	157
Uzbek	47.9	52.1	48
Other	26.1	73.9	46
Entire Sample	40.5	59.5	730
Statistical Test	Sig = 0.001		X <sup>2</sup> = 56.357

Table 48: The attitude of elites towards economic policies based on ethnicity

### 5. Conclusion: Different Levels of Attitude Toward Iranian Policies

Given the different dimensions of Iran's policies in Afghanistan, as shown in the table below, the most positive attitude of the elites is toward Iran's religious policies and the least favorable attitude is directed at Iranian security policies. In fact, if we want to arrange this in a sequential manner, the positive attitude toward Iran's policies toward Afghanistan has been religious, economic, social, and ultimately, security policies.

Attitude Level	Religious	Economic	Social	Security
Positive	66.4	59.4	57.1	45.1
Negative	33.6	40.6	42.9	54.9

Table 49: Different Levels of the Attitude of the Elite




Figure 15: Levels of Attitude in the Four Axes

## Chapter Three

### Afghan Elite's Level of Trust Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran

#### 1. The Elite's Level of Trust

If we combine the 68 indicators related to the concept and index of trust, the index will be constructed. This indicator is made in a way that the low score indicates very low trust and the high score shows a high degree of trust.

As the figures in the below table show, the trust of the Afghanistan elite in Iran is very low and low for 6 and 27 percent of the respondents, respectively, of which approximately 34 percent have little confidence in Iran. In contrast, about 40 percent of the elite trust Iran at high levels, and 4 percent at very high levels. One can finally state that the trust of about 44 percent of the elite in the Iranian government is high. Meanwhile, 22 percent of the respondents also somewhat trust Iran.

Trust Level	Number	Percentage
Very low	46	6.3
Low	201	27.5
Average	165	22.6
High	289	39.6
Very high	29	4.0
Total	730	100

Table 50: Distribution of respondents according to the trust of elites




Figure 16: Distribution of respondents according to the trust of elites

## 2. The Relationship of Individual Characteristics with Trust

### A. The Relationship of Gender with the Amount of Trust

According to the findings, the level of high trust in the Iranian government among women is equal to 46.5% and 41% among men. Therefore, there is no significant statistical difference between men and women. Therefore, it can be inferred that the male and female elite of Afghanistan have almost the same confidence in Iran.

Trust Gender	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Number
Male	6.1	29.5	22.7	37.8	3.8	444
Female	6.6	24.5	22.4	42.3	4.2	286
Statistical Test	X <sup>2</sup> = 2.632					Sig = 0.621

Table 51: The elite's trust based on gender

### B. The Relationship of Religion with the Amount of Trust

As the research findings show, the level of confidence in the country among the Sunni elites is equal to 35% and 64% among the Shiites. Comparison of attitudes obtained through the statistical test shows a significant difference. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Shiite elites have more faith in Iran than the Sunni elites.

Trust Religion	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Number
Sunni	8.3	34.5	22.2	32.1	2.8	504
Shia	1.8	11.8	22.7	56.8	6.8	220
Statistical Test	X <sup>2</sup> = 68.596					Sig = 0.001

Table 52: The elite's trust based on religion

### C. The Relationship of Living Experience in Iran with the Amount of Trust

The findings show that the degree of trust in Iran among those with living experience in Iran and those without this experience are 51% and 40%, respectively. Comparison of attitudes obtained through the statistical test shows a significant difference. It can be concluded that the elites who stay in Iran have a higher degree of trust in Iran than those who have not lived in Iran.

Trust Residence	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Number
Yes	3.5	20.3	24.8	45.5	5.9	202
No	7.4	30.3	21.8	37.3	3.2	528
Statistical Test	X <sup>2</sup> = 14.673					Sig = 0.005

Table 53: The elite's trust based on living experience in Iran



#### D. The Relationship of Age with the Amount of Trust

The age variable does not have a meaningful relation with the level of trust of the elites.

Trust \ Age	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Number
18-29	5.6	28.1	21.6	41.6	3.1	320
30-44	6.5	27.1	25.5	37.1	3.7	321
45 and over	7.9	27.0	15.7	41.6	7.9	89
Statistical Test	X <sup>2</sup> = 8.857				Sig = 0.354	

Table 54: The elite's trust based on age

#### E. The Relationship of Education with the Amount of Trust

Studies show that the level of confidence of people with doctoral degrees is higher than other groups and is lowest level of trust is for those with a diploma. These differences are statistically significant.

Trust \ Education	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Number
Diploma	8.7	35.9	22.8	29.3	3.3	92
Associate's	6.9	24.3	27.8	36.8	4.2	144
Bachelor's	5.3	27.8	20.5	43.3	3.2	342
Master's	6.3	24.1	23.2	42.0	4.5	112
Ph.D.	8.8	20.6	11.8	52.9	5.9	17
Religious Ed.	4.3	34.8	26.1	21.7	13.0	23
Statistical Test	X <sup>2</sup> = 22.559				Sig = 0.05	

Table 55: The elite's trust based on education

#### F. The Relationship of Province of Residence with the Amount of Trust

The findings show that the perspective elites differ by the place of living. Comparison of attitudes obtained through the statistical test shows a significant difference. Elites of Paktiya, Herat, Kabul and Bamyan have the highest degree of trust on Iran.

Trust \ Province	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	Number
Herat	5.0	18.8	26.3	40.0	10.0	80
Farah	16.0	34.0	24.0	18.0	8.0	50
Paktia	2.0	12.0	10.0	70.0	6.0	50
Kandahar	7.5	32.5	26.3	33.8	0.0	80
Nangarhar	22.5	53.8	12.5	11.3	0.0	80
Kabul	1.9	23.8	24.4	46.9	3.1	160
Balkh	1.3	26.3	23.8	43.8	5.0	80
Joozjan	6.0	28.0	28.0	30.0	8.0	50

Bamiyan	4.0	22.0	24.0	48.0	2.0	50
Badakhshan	0.0	20.0	24.0	56.0	0.0	50
Statistical Test	X2 = 157.774				Sig = 0.001	

Table 56: The elite's trust based on province of residence

### G. The Relationship of Ethnicity with the Amount of Trust

Comparison of attitudes obtained through the statistical test shows a significant difference. Tajiks and Hazaras have the highest trust on Iran policies.

Trust \ Ethnicity	Trust					Number
	Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	
Pashtun	13.9	44.8	19.4	20.2	1.6	252
Tajik	2.7	21.2	22.6	48.7	4.9	226
Hazara	1.9	13.9	23.4	53.2	7.6	157
Uzbek	4.2	27.1	22.9	43.8	2.1	48
Other	0.0	10.9	37.0	50.0	2.2	46
Statistical Test	X2 = 134.651				Sig = 0.001	

Table 57: The elite's trust based on province of ethnicity

## 3. The Correlation of the Trust Index with Attitudes toward Security, Religious, Social and Economic Policies

By studying the three basic concepts in this study, we examine the correlation coefficient. The result of the relationship between the degree of trust variable and the attitude towards the four policies shows a positive correlation. This finding means that as much as their confidence in the government of Iran is higher, their attitude towards Iran's policies in the quadruple is more positive and, conversely, the greater the positive attitude toward Quadruple policies mean higher confidence in Iran.

Index	Correlation with Trust Index	
	Correlation Coefficient	Meaningfulness
Attitude toward security policies	0.807	0.001
Attitude toward religious policies	0.840	0.001
Attitude toward social policies	0.841	0.001
Attitude toward economic policies	0.770	0.001

Table 58: Correlation of Indicators of Attitude to Quadruple Policies with Trust Index

The following table also shows that as much as the attitude towards Iran's security, religion, social and economic policies is more positive, the level of trust has also increased.

Attitude Toward		Trust					Statistical Test
		Very Low	Low	Average	High	Very High	
Security policies	Negative	11.5	45.6	25.7	17.2	0.0	X2 = 295.3 Sig = 0.001
	Positive	0.0	5.5	18.8	66.9	8.8	
Religious policies	Negative	18.8	56.7	18.0	6.5	0.0	X2 = 325.2 Sig = 0.001
	Positive	0.0	12.8	24.9	56.3	6.0	
Social policies	Negative	14.7	53.7	24.3	7.3	0.0	X2 = 363.6 Sig = 0.001
	Positive	0.0	7.9	21.3	63.8	7.0	
Economic policies	Negative	14.9	52.4	18.9	13.2	7.0	X2 = 273.8 Sig = 0.001
	Positive	5.0	10.6	25.1	57.6	6.2	

Table 59: Correlation of the Trust index and the quadruple policies

## Conclusion

### 1. Profile of the Elite

In this study's sample, 61 percent were men and 39 percent were women. Of these, 69 percent are Sunnis and 30 percent are Shiites. The average age of the elite is 33 years, and the highest age is 25 years old. About half of the respondents have bachelor's degree, 15% have Master's degree and 2% doctorate. By ethnicity, Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups have the highest proportion of individuals with 34 and 32 percent, respectively. After them, Hazaras make up 22% and Uzbeks form 7% of the population. Apart from Kabul, which accounted for about one-fifth of the sample, the rest of the provinces, each of which had either 6.5 or 11 percent of the sample. Of the elite in this study, about one-third had the experience of residence in Iran.

### 2. Attitude of the Elite toward Iranian Policies

Considering the different dimensions of Iran's policies in Afghanistan, the highest level of agreement with Iran's policies are on the religious axes, and the least level of acceptance is directed to security policies. In the following section, we will discuss them further:

#### A. Attitude toward Security Policies

More than half of the elites in Afghanistan (about 55 percent) have expressed dissatisfaction with Iran's political and security policies toward Afghanistan. On the other hand, 45% have a positive attitude. Studies in this regard show that the age of the Afghanistan elite does not have an impact on their attitude toward security policies. In contrast, the Shiite elites (compared to their Sunni compatriots), those with higher levels of education, women elites, elites in Paktia and Badakhshan provinces, as well as the elites who experienced traveling and living in Iran, have a more positive attitude toward Iran's security policies.

#### B. Attitude toward Social Policies

According to the survey, 57 percent of the elite have expressed satisfaction with Iran's social policies and, in contrast, 43 percent are dissatisfied. Studies show that the gender, age, and education of the Afghanistan elite do not affect their attitude toward social policies, which is roughly the same. In contrast, Hazara, Tajik, and Shi'ite elites, as well as those of Paktia and Badakhshan provinces, have a more positive attitude toward Iranian social policies than others. Similarly, elites who had lived in Iran have a significantly more positive attitude towards Iran's social policies compared to those who have not lived in Iran.

#### C. Attitude toward Religious Policies

In relation to Iran's religious policies, most elites are satisfied with Iran's activities in this regard (66.4%). By contrast, 33% have expressed their dissatisfaction with these policies. A closer examination of this issue shows that elite Afghanistan women and men's attitudes are almost identical to Iran's religious policies, and their attitudes toward religious policies are not altered by age difference. The elites staying in Iran have a more positive attitude toward Iranian religious policies than those who did not live in Iran.

Opposite to the above findings, the most decisive variable are the type of ethnicity, religion, and place of residence of the elites. More precisely, Shiite elites have a much more positive attitude toward the religious policies of Iran compared to Sunni elites. The elites of Paktia and Bamyan provinces have a more positive attitude toward Iranian religious policies than any other province. More accurate

findings also show that the Hazara elites have a significantly more positive attitude toward the religious policies of Iran in Afghanistan than Pashtuns. Therefore, the perception of the elites of Afghanistan towards Iran's religious policies is influenced by religious and ethnic culture rather than being influenced by personal and modern life experiences (e.g. literacy, age, traveling to Iran, etc.). Sociologically, the Afghanistan community is a tribal community with religious differences that both give rise to gaps. If religious and ethnic divisions are condensed, they will easily endanger the state and security of the country.

#### D. Attitude toward Economic Policies

According to this study, 59% of the elites have expressed satisfaction with Iran's economic policies and 41% are opposed to them. More precisely, Shiite elites have a much more positive attitude toward Iran's economic policies than Sunni elites. In fact, Shiite elites are more positive towards all of Iran's policies. Hazaras and Tajiks also have a more positive attitude, and compared to other ethnic groups, the Pashtun people have a more negative attitude toward Iran's economic policies.

Those elites with higher levels of education and the elites of Paktia and Badakhshan provinces have a more positive attitude toward economic and other Iranian policies than other provinces. Studies show that gender of Afghanistan's elites does not affect their attitude to economic policies, which is roughly the same.

### Overall Achievements of the Present Study: Outcome

When Stephen Walt published his famous "Renaissance Security Studies" in 1991, the end of the Cold War and the dominance of more than a dozen studies of liberalism (or, in better words, idealism), in international relations, was a beacon a new era in which, contrary to all history behind it, peace has become the main rule in the international arena. Beliefs were directed toward the understanding that the fundamental transformation at the end of the Cold War has justified the preference for critical and post-structuralist studies in the field of security, and looking at security from a narrow realist angle is reasonable no more. But Stephen Walt, in 1991, once again announced the upcoming resurrection of security studies from this perspective to restate one point: The continuation of the security issue in its strict sense and the need for seriousness in looking at peace from the angle of the phenomenon of war. After this article, the wars of the Persian Gulf, the wars of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen occurred, and thus the importance of security from a strict viewpoint will be reemphasized.

Barbara Tuckman writes in the "The Guns August," which explores the events that led to the First World War and its duration that the last two years of the 1900s were the quietest years. 1910 enjoyed peace and prosperity, and the second turn of the Moroccan crisis and the Balkan war had not yet come to pass. A new book, "The Great Illusion," by Norman Angell, had just been published, proving that there was no possibility of war. Angell, with impressive examples and indisputable arguments showed that in the current financial and economic dependency of nations, the conqueror will also be as defeated as the conquered, and so war is not worthwhile, and thus no nation is stupid enough to start a war. This book was translated into eleven languages. It took only less than four years for war spanning three continents to breakout, and all of Angell's arguments in his famous book were completely upended.

Wars are one-dimensional and often unpredictable phenomena, and the subject of security and its transformations is so complex that the various forms of dentate tower theory for the interpretation of war, as long as they do not consider the nature, seriousness and the sensitive of it, are nothing but purposeless prescriptions for an ill person suffering from fever and inflammation. There are no predetermined rules on which war or conflict can be predicted nor can one give an absolutely certain opinion about the occurrence of conflict. The prediction of future moves using external situations is a

big mistake because external situations are only factors that, in the most optimistic way, modulate or constrict the actor's intentions. Certainly, there is no transcendental position to read the intentions of man's active mind.

Perhaps the last few sentences would be enough to guide us into the depth of Robert Jervis's mindset in international relations. Thoughts that, gradually and above all else, come to understand that rejecting this transcendental standpoint of reading the actor's intentions, takes into account some of his life experiences and uses political psychoanalysis to analyze and explain the phenomenon of conflict. Robert Jervis defined war with another pretext; the pretext whose first entry was in the context of war: misconception is a serious factor for beginning war. Robert Jervis drew up a set of coordinates based on which, if the probability of war is on the Y axis, misunderstandings or misconceptions are placed on the X axis. So the further we move on the X axis (increasing misconceptions), we will also go higher on the Y axis (increasing the probability of war).

But, in order to remove the concept of misunderstanding from his semantic package, he employed new tools and models, and personally used this new modeling and conceptualization in an article that he wrote in 1989 along with several of his colleagues titled "Attitude of the American Elite towards the Soviet Union," in which Jervis used an elite attitude to understand the perception or misunderstanding of the elites (and, consequently, future policies). This paper was a project that was completed over time reached its height of progress in the latest book by Jervis, which in a way was the comprehensive application political psychology in international relations, entitled "How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics."

All of Jervis's emphasis in these studies has been on the fact that in order to understand war and assess the likelihood of war, it is necessary to measure levels of misunderstandings, both in intentions and in terms of actors; how others respond to actions by an actor in certain circumstances. According to him, governments usually prefer to interpret the actions of others with aggression and ill intention toward themselves. This is the basis for calculation errors, the judgmental deviations of military pessimism, and so on, which ultimately can lead to war in two different models (as described in their original book). As a result, Jervis argues that the most important way to avoid conflict war (in all meanings, levels and dimensions) is targeting misunderstandings and providing a true picture of the intentions of the activists. What is essential to begin this complex and important process is to interpret the attitudes regarding how others (respondents) evaluate our behavior and see our image looks.

All this brings us to the core of our study, which is to summarize what we have been doing in this research. Both Iran and Afghanistan have existed in a historical and civilian context from long ago, and the cultural heritage of the two countries has many commonalities and products. Over the past decades, a series of trends and developments (such as the huge migration of Afghanistan citizens to Iran, the civilian conflict in Afghanistan with the presence of regional and non-regional powers, environmental crises and, in general, human security issues), has created certain dynamics in the relations of both countries that are at least of some crucial importance: Its future impact on Iran-Afghanistan relations.

Although ethnic, historical, social and cultural ties between the two countries are so wide-ranging that they bring tranquility to every turbulent mind that the possibility of conflict between the two countries is largely excluded, the preconditions for discussion have taught us that this type of certainty is a poison that ultimately leads to disagreements; fearing to see crises that, one after another, will sour the relations between the two countries and change the path of relations.

The second point is that when there is discussion regarding conflict, the inevitable outcome is not military confrontation, and it is easy to get rid of this belittling generalization. Is the unbalancing of relations between Iran and Afghanistan (given the same historical and civilization background) not a significant conflict? And is withdrawal of the balance between the two countries with such links, in perspective, less than a serious international conflict? The first conclusion to be drawn from the

present study is a very simple point: The conflict between Iran and Afghanistan due to misunderstandings is as likely a conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia or between Iran and the United States.

Understanding this point brings us to the more important issue: Understanding the current state of relations between Iran and Afghanistan will be a prelude to assess the future. It is important to note because there has been no ground for direct understanding of the perception of the elites and the Afghanistan society about Iran's policies and actions regarding this country; and with regard to the path of transformation, the main understanding has always focused on the issue that Iran's actions in Afghanistan are rational and desirable; and there has never been a serious effort to provide direct feedback on the results of these policies in the Afghanistan community. Based on the findings of this study, it can be said that the foreign policy makers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while (perhaps) considering all other factors in Afghanistan, have neglected the most important factor: How do these policies have been interpreted and understood in Afghanistan, and where will the results go? This has been the present study's second purpose, and it has been worth of attention as the creation of a basic and modest, but reliable basis to receive feedback in this regard. Looking at oneself from the viewpoint of "the other" is the most important step this research has tried to take.

The third point that this study has been looking for, both for Iran and for Afghanistan, is that the reception and perception of the image of Iran's actions in Afghanistan provides the opportunity to make a serious regulation of the relations between the two countries and to avoid passing issues and problems to an uncertain future. Indeed, neither the Iranian authorities nor the politicians in Afghanistan welcome the unwanted and unaware regulation of bilateral relations due to unrelated or foreign factors, thus understanding the issues and actions in between and repairing shortcomings and misunderstandings in the present, in order to grasp control of all affairs in the future, is the most important of principles and cannot be neglected. Dynamic and active presence in this field (which is implicitly given in the first assumption and the basis of our discussion that is the need to strengthen the central government in Afghanistan) leads on down this track to first fully understand what is happening, so that we can plan for the future according to the underpinning basis. In the meantime, focusing on strengthening the central government in Afghanistan and avoiding the transformation of tactical collisions into long-term strategies regarding the strengthening of centrifugal actions in Afghanistan, which have already emphasized, is the precursor to such regulation and balance for the future; because any action to undermine the central government's deliberate or unwanted weakening in Afghanistan is precisely in the same direction as the transfer of affairs to the out-of-control counts and forces.

This important issue also has a direct result for the elite and decision makers in Afghanistan; which is government officials in Afghanistan should make it clear for themselves that Iran is an integral part of Afghanistan's geopolitics and that Iran's interaction and understanding as well as its actions in Afghanistan, with the assumption of accepting the above conditions, will indisputably and directly contribute to strengthening the central government in Afghanistan and its domination over the political and social boundaries of the country.

If we want to express in a simple and brief way all that has been given in this study, it can be said that from the point of view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the complicated conditions in the West, South and East of Iran, in the Arabian Middle East and the Persian Gulf, on the one hand, and issues regarding Afghanistan's, on the other hand, have put Iran at a critical juncture; this position includes both opportunities and threats. The sensitive conditions of Iran's peripheral environment have not left any room for mistakes, even if these errors and miscalculations do not result in long-term consequences. Sensitivity in the peripheral environment is so much that miscalculations with short-term consequences may have consequences that can seriously threaten the national security of Iran.

The results of this survey indicate the conditions of understanding and perception of the elites of Afghanistan about the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in their country, not as positive perhaps as policy-makers in Iran imagine. Today, not only is there no absolutely positive understanding of the role of Iran among the elite of Afghanistan, but according to current findings, this perception has a significant negative dimension. The objective appearance of this negative perception of Iran can be seen in several demonstrations of the people of Afghanistan against the Islamic Republic of Iran's embassy.

Given that from the perspective of this paper, the strengthening of the central government in Afghanistan is the only way to secure Iran's national security, certain current policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which have negatively affected Iran's image in the eyes of Afghanistan's elite, are not in favor of Iran's national interests. It seems that the requirement to change this negative perception is a general overview of Iran's policies towards Afghanistan.

As our final words, the nature of threats determines the way of coping with and managing them. The nature of the threats posed to Iran by instability in Afghanistan will only be controlled and managed through the formation of a central authority. On the other hand, the weakness of the central government in Afghanistan will not only affect Iran, but will also have a devastating effect on the daily lives of millions of people who do not even have the basic requirements of life due to instability and insecurity. Any improvement or hope for improvement in the lives of these people will only be conceivable if there is security, and this will only happen with the formation of a powerful central government in Afghanistan.



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Gholamali Chaganizadeh, born in January 1960, completed his elementary and secondary education in Iran. He traveled to the United States in 1977 to continue his undergraduate studies and returned to Iran after completing his bachelor's degree. Mr. Chaganizadeh completed his Master's degree at the University of Leichard, UK, and received his Ph.D. from the Bradford Peace Studies University. He joined the Allameh Tabataba'i University faculty of law and political science from 1998 and is currently teaching at that faculty. His main expertise is regional and international security studies.

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Dr. Sardar Mohammad Rahimi was born in 1977 in Urozgan province. He has completed his education until his Ph.D. degree in Iran. Teaching at the private and public universities of Afghanistan during master programs has been one of his most important activities during these years. In addition, he has also devoted his time and efforts to research and study activities. Since 2012, he has been a member of the Afghanistan Policy Group with a number of political figures in the country. He has been serving as the Deputy Minister of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 2016 until now.



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