By Mohammad Naser Sidiqee
Peace in Afghanistan has engaged the attention of many players, including Russia and Iran. The Afghan people and government are seemingly content with the international community and regional states playing a role in the Afghan peace process. Over the last 17 years, Afghans have had to deal with many difficulties exacerbated by the ongoing conflict. And the eagerness now showed by regional and international actors to address the crisis has been received by open arms.
However, at the heart of the matter is that each player often has competing interests in Afghanistan. While these interests are unlikely to remove the obstacles to peace, they also increase the difficulties of achieving peace. Specifically, Russian strategic interests, most notably in the wake of America re-imposing sanctions against Iran, will direct its efforts at making the Afghan peace process difficult and giving the Americans and Afghans a hard time as they try to end the war.
With its South Asia strategy — announced in August 2017 by the Trump administration — the US initially committed to employing brute force to compel insurgents to negotiate a peace agreement. But ever since the US backpedaled from its initial stance and started to negotiate directly with the Taliban, the Taliban have expanded into the greater territory and murdered more people in Afghanistan.
US talks with the Taliban are at best premature at this stage, since its abrupt intervention is discrediting the "Afghan-owned and Afghan-led" peace efforts that have been going on for at least a decade.
The public is already cynical about peace attempts by international actors as well as the Afghan government. A recent research conducted by Omar Sadr at the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies showed that more than 63% of people believe that the peace process has failed.
People’s distrust in the ongoing efforts mainly stems from their lack of involvement in the process and the government’s lack of transparency. One of the greatest dangers of keeping people in the dark is that in the event of a peace deal, it will make the job of reintegrating the Taliban into society painfully difficult.
The study also associates such failures to inconsistent, incoherent, and un-coordinated efforts by different stakeholders who often overrule each other’s endeavors. Internally, while southern and eastern populations have been the flag-bearer of opponents of a military-only solution to the problem, Afghans in the north have long maintained that only a powerful military campaign can tilt the balance in favor of the government. The divide between the southeast and northwest reflects ethnic differences exacerbated by the history of oppression and concentration of power in the hands of one ethnic group. Thus, in the absence of active participation by all ethnic groups, the conflict of opinion will make reconciliation of the Taliban impractical and a viable peace deal inconceivable.
Moreover, a hasty approach can precipitate another political crisis like that of the 1990s, when the US abandoned Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. It seems that the Trump administration has little concern for the long-term implications of its “dignified exit” and abandoning its intervention without accomplishing the strategic goal of defeating terrorism.
Is Russia Pouring Cold Water on US Peace Plans in Afghanistan?
Adding confusion to an already complex issue, Russia introduced its Moscow-led push for peace in Afghanistan in 2017 and held its first round of talks with the eleven member countries in April that year. Looking at the timing of Russia’s diplomatic offensive “to facilitate the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan and secure peace in [this] country as soon as possible,” — as per the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — clearly its intent was anything but “narrowing the gaps” between Afghans.
Once the Afghanistan’s interim authority was formed in 2002, the Russians were among the least inclined to consider any settlement with the Taliban on the battlefield or in politics. Looking at this radical change in Russian policy today, one can simply not resist the temptation to doubt its intentions. Moreover, the Moscow format excluded the United States, the most active and important stakeholder in Afghanistan’s war. Needless to say, the US declined to take part.
That did not prevent Russia from growing more ambitious. It conducted the second round of Moscow talks on Afghanistan in November 2018 in which the Taliban also took part. This event immensely discouraged the majority of Afghanistan people, who for the first time saw on screen the representatives of a terrorist group that has ripped the country apart. The Taliban’s presence in the Moscow-led conference revived the collective memory of their barbaric rule between 1996 and 2001.
In the second Moscow conference, the Taliban mostly acted as a Russian mouthpiece. In their statement, the Taliban’s call for peace started with “ending occupation and changing the American War Policy.” These points raised by the Taliban, especially the ones concerning the US, are also reflected in the Russian Foreign Ministry’s press notes. In a statement issued on August 22, the ministry expressed regret about the US refusal to participate in the Moscow conference. Russia blamed the suffering of Afghans on US policies.
Clearly, ever since the “combatant[s] against the United States”, as former White House Spokesperson Ari Fleischer had said on the eve of the deceased Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s surrender of Kandahar, have turned into “reconcilable elements” and instead of “bringing justice to [the Taliban] or them to justice” “political settlement” has become “the best way to way to end violence in Afghanistan” the Taliban’s appetite for greater concessions has increased.
Whereas during the Shah Wali Kot negotiations in 2001 the Taliban only demanded amnesty, they are now aspiring to re-establish their so-called Islamic emirate. Such a development neglects the sacrifices made by the Afghans and coalition forces.
The Crux of Ghani’s Administration
The way that President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani has defined the fight against the Taliban, who he sometimes refers to as “political opposition” and other times as “armed opposition,” has profoundly impacted the way the United States sees the Taliban.
In the wake of the tragic events of 9/11, the US and its allied forces seemed to have genuinely come together in a clear show of solidarity in the war on terror. However, over the last 17 years, the broad consensus on the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan has waned.
From the day that Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, has started his mission to make peace in Afghanistan, President Ghani and his entourage have been desperately pursuing even the slightest hope or possibility for it to fail.
It is true that the negotiations that Khalilzad conducted with the Taliban in Qatar brought the post-2001 order in Afghanistan under attack and it is valid for the Afghanistan government to remain suspicious. However, any agreement with the Taliban prior to 2019 presidential will eliminate the prospects for Ghani to run for a second term.
Khalilzad’s mission, who at best seeks a “dignified exit” for US troops, is a political turning point for Ghani who has promised to bring peace. A dignified exit for the US is likely to end the alliance between Ghani and Washington. To avoid becoming collateral damage of the US peace plan, Ghani’s clique is putting relentless pressure on the US government and the Afghan public to rally support for its own plans.
In an opinion piece on TRT World, Afghanistan political analyst Helena Malikyar hinted at President Ghani’s true fears. She stated that “although [Khalilzad] has not announced a peace plan,” rumors suggest there will be a postponement of the presidential elections in 2019 as well as the “dissolution of the current elected Afghan government.”
In another article for The Washington Post, President Ghani’s chairman of the Independent Civil Service Commission, Nader Nadery, brought up the “unchanged” Taliban stance and argued that a hasty approach “weakens the positions” of both the Afghan and US governments.
Political considerations are important. However, one is baffled by Nadery's disingenuous ignorance. The Taliban’s position was still "unchanged" when President Ghani offered them “talks without preconditions” in the Kabul process conference in February. His master's lump sum proposition to the Taliban did not "strike him" at all. However, when the United States decides to throw its lot behind its own peace plan, the public suddenly “won’t settle for a political deal that is rushed through."
It goes without saying that President Ghani is racing against time for a second term and that his goal is to avoid the embarrassment of failing to meet the expectations of the people, rather than “protecting the transformed Afghanistan.”
It seems that President Ghani and his exclusive circle remain hopeful that they are able to rein in the Taliban and mark the end of the long war. But at the moment they are more inclined to winning a second term than they are committed to peace. Moreover, Ghani’s administration is being accused of exploiting government funds and resources for political purposes. If successful, the post-election government will put Ghani in a stronger position to not only engage in talks with the Taliban but also to lull public disappointment of his performance.
Naser Sidiqee is development practitioner, observer of Afghanistan political history and lecturer at Dunya University, Afghanistan.
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The article does not reflect the official opinion of the AISS