Tuesday 09 July 2013
By Hussain Hassrat
Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS)
Introduction
Every warring army needs to know its enemy; the same is true for running a successful negotiation process, which in turn necessitates a deep knowledge of the conflict parties, their modus operandi, and their aim and intentions (Giustozzi, 2010). Having an accurate picture of the Taliban helps the government of Afghanistan and other stakeholders to invest more in current peace negotiation efforts, which have not produced any results in the past 6-7 years. The Taliban are better understood by their ethno-religious characteristics, their political agenda and proxy wars fought with the central government during recent years and by their international allies.
The events of September 11, 2001 were indirectly attributed to the Taliban due to their provision of safe sanctuary to al-Qaeda’s leaders and training camps for its fighters. The United States military intervention in Afghanistan was unleashed when the Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the United States for trial. The intervention resulted in a quick collapse of the Taliban and a commitment by NATO allies to the global war against terrorism, and Afghanistan’s reconstruction.
Although there was no clear or concrete framework for structuring and conditioning the negotiations, the talks and peace negotiations began rapidly after the Taliban regime was dismantled in December 2001. At that time, the objective of such initiatives was merely an invitation for the Taliban to join the new, broad-based and democratic Afghanistan. The peace talk endeavours led by the Afghan Government and the international community did not achieve notable success. The predominant approach was clearly ad hoc, resulting in more and increasing ambiguity within and outside of Afghanistan (Sharma, 2012). Thereafter, the government and the international community intensified their efforts to convince the Taliban to follow their interests through peaceful means rather than violence. Though the first phase of the international community’s involvement was basically military-oriented, they gradually changed their attitudes towards the Afghan conflict. Now, most of the international community recognizes that the war in Afghanistan will have a political rather than a military solution (Brahimi & Pickering, 2001).
Peace itself, or the impossibility of peace, is not greatly discussed within or outside of Afghanistan. What is discussed are the processes and structures of peace-seeking. Peace talks, which seem to be part of the grand conflict transformation project, do not consider the root causes, rapidly changing reasons and escalating dynamics of conflict. This ambiguity at both policy and practical levels has affected the expected quality of the peace talks.